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 “When Greek meets Greek, then comes the tug of war” 
- Proverb, based on play by Nathaniel Lee 1766 
 
The recent shift in power in the retailing landscape has grasped the attention of many 
academics and practitioners (Ailawadi et al. 2010). Traditionally, manufacturers have 
dominated the retailing landscape, providing them an attractive bargaining position 
and the upper hand in manufacturer-retailer negotiations. Their large size was in stark 
contrast to the fragmented and often local retailers, allowing them to impose their 
prices and other buying conditions on these typically small retailers (Ailawadi, Borin 
and Farris 1995; Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). More recently, the 
rise of private label brands (Ailawadi 2001; Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010), 
the availability of advanced consumer information such as scanner data (Chu and 
Messinger 1998), scarcity of shelf space (Ailawadi, Borin, and Farris 1995), pass-
through of trade promotions (Ailawadi et al. 2010), and the creation of large retailer 
agglomerations (Aalto-Setälä 2002; Dawar and Stornelli 2012; Messinger and 
Narasimhan 1995) have tilted this power balance, leading to manufacturer-retailer 
relationships in which both parties are very powerful.  
This shift in power balance posits managerial challenges for both parties. While 
manufacturers were able to pressure retailers into complying in ‘the good old days’, 
they nowadays face a strong and solid counterparty. On the one hand, manufacturers 
depend on retailers as they make the final decision which brands to carry in their 
assortment (Dukes, Geylani, and Srinivasan 2009), while on the other hand, the 
introduction of private labels transformed retailers into direct competitors for the 
manufacturers’ national brands. In a similar vein, the stronger bargaining position 
allows retailers to fight back to the once almighty manufacturers. The relationship with 
manufacturers is complex for retailers as well, as retailers depend on manufacturers’ 
often popular national brands to generate store traffic (Shankar, Carpenter, and Farley 
2012), while at the same time, the intense competitiveness of the current retailing 
landscape obliges retailers to keep the prices of the national brands at an 
unprecedented low in order to survive (The Telegraph 2016).         
All in all, the relational dynamics between manufacturers and retailers are complex, 
and while it is yet unclear who exactly has the power in the retailing landscape, the 
two parties are a good match for each other. This is reflected in the struggling 
negotiations between the two parties, which, due to their frequently conflicting 
objectives, often go sour. In an attempt to pressure the opponent to comply with its 
demands, both the manufacturer and retailer often (threaten to) delist products from 
the shelves until the conflict is resolved. This phenomenon is referred to as conflict 
delistings.  
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1.1 CONFLICT DELISTINGS 
Conflict delistings are defined as a temporary delisting of products due to a conflict 
(Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). Conflict delistings occur frequently 
in the current retailing landscape. To exemplify, discounter Lidl delisted all Coca-Cola, 
Fanta, and Sprite soft drinks from their shelves in a price conflict (Die Welt 2014). In a 
similar vein, Dutch manufacturer Aviko ceased the delivery of their products to retailer 
Jumbo, after Jumbo did not comply with their increased prices (Distrifood 2016). Other 
examples of conflict delistings include the delisting of Mattel’s Disney dolls by toy store 
Fun (De Standaard 2011), and the delisting of paint brand Alpina by Do-It-Yourself (DIY) 
store Obi (Lebensmittelzeitung 2005). Conflict delistings can include a wide variety of 
products, ranging from a single SKU or variety to a delisting of multiple brands. As 
illustrated by above examples, both manufacturers and retailers can initiate a conflict 
delisting. Indeed, the manufacturer can decide to cease the delivery of their products 
to the retailer, while the retailer can opt to remove manufacturers’ brands from the 
shelf. However, this strategy can have a major (financial) impact for a company. For 
instance, Premier Foods announced that a conflict delisting by Tesco cost them £10 
million (The Grocer 2011a). 
Firms may have numerous reasons to engage in conflict delistings, however, the 
majority of conflict delistings are due to price negotiations gone sour. This could 
involve both disagreements about wholesale prices and disagreements about 
consumer prices. While Britvic withheld supply of Pepsi to Sainsbury’s after the retailer 
refused the demands for a significant increase in wholesale prices (The Grocer 2011b), 
Dutch manufacturer Peijnenburg ceased the delivery of their popular 600 gram 
breakfast cake to retailer Albert Heijn when the retailer would not increase the 
consumer price of the product (Distrifood 2005a). Also other buying conditions, such 
as shelf space allocation or promotional support, could lead to conflict delistings. In 
addition, several retailers initiated conflict delistings when a manufacturer decided to 
offer steep price promotions for their product at a competing retailer, often a 
discounter. To exemplify, German retailer group Metro delisted confectionary brands 
Toffifee and Merci from manufacturer Stock in response to a price reduction of 
Toffifee at discounter Aldi (Lebensmittelzeitung 2004).  
1.2 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Based on an extensive literature review, three prominent gaps regarding conflict 
delistings can be identified. 
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1.2.1 Gap #1: Performance Implications of Conflict Delistings 
Despite the inherent managerial importance, research on the performance 
implications of conflict delistings is still scarce. An important exception is a study by 
Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren (2017), who investigated consumer 
reactions to conflict delistings using one specific conflict case. They find that, in that 
particular conflict case, both the manufacturer and retailer suffered severe market 
share losses due to the conflict delisting. However, it is currently unclear whether their 
findings can be generalized to other delisting situations. Due to the lack of literature, I 
will therefore consider a related literature stream: product unavailability. 
 An inherent characteristic of conflict delistings is the unavailability of products at a 
retailer. In this light, conflict delistings may be similar to other product unavailability 
types, such as assortment reductions, out-of-stock occurrences (OOS), product harm 
crises, and brand delistings (e.g., Borle et al. 2005; Emmelhainz et al. 1991; Sloot and 
Verhoef 2008; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). However, findings from these 
studies cannot directly be transferred to a conflict delisting context, due to important 
differences between the various unavailability types. Table 1.1 provides an overview 
and comparison of conflict delistings to other product unavailability types. Most 
noteworthy is the underlying cause of the unavailability. In the case of conflict 
delistings, products are deliberately unavailable due to a manufacturer-retailer 
conflict. This arguably has important implications for amongst others, consumer 
decision making, due to the strong attribution of blame. Indeed, consumers do not 
only respond to the delisting, but also to the conflict itself. Nevertheless, given the 
scarce literature on conflict delistings, we depend on the product unavailability 
literature to provide some valuable insights. From the studies on OOS occurrences, 
product harm crises, and brand delistings, there is an indication that product 
unavailability might be harmful for both manufacturers and retailers. In contrast, the 
assortment reduction literature provides ambiguous results, with some studies 
reporting negative (Borle et al. 2005) and others reporting no (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and 
McAlister 1998) or positive consequences (Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994). 
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Table 1.1: Overview Conflict Delistings: Comparison to Other Product Unavailability Types 
 Cause of 
unavailability 
Deliberate 
action 
Time span Affected products Scope of 
unavailability 
Assortment 
reduction 
Increase 
operational 
efficiency 
Yes Long-term 
(permanent) 
SKU, predominantly  
low equity products 
All stores of one 
retail chain 
Out-of-Stock 
(OOS) 
Issues with 
delivery  
No Short-term  
(typically few 
days)  
Brand/SKU, could be 
either high- or low 
equity products 
Typically one 
isolated store 
Product-harm 
crises 
Product 
malfunction 
No Long-term 
(typically few 
months) 
SKU, could be either 
high- or low equity 
products 
Nationwide, in all 
retail chains 
Brand delistings Unspecified Yes Long-term 
(permanent) 
Brand, could be either 
high- or low equity 
products 
All stores of one 
retail chain 
Conflict 
delistings 
Channel conflict Yes Short-term 
(typically few 
weeks) 
Brand/ SKU, could be 
either high- or low 
equity products 
All stores of one 
retail chain 
 
1.2.2 Gap #2: Conditions under Which Conflict Delistings are More or Less Harmful 
There is an extensive literature stream on inter-organizational conflicts, in which 
various aspects of conflicts have been investigated. Prior literature mainly focused on 
the antecedents of channel conflicts and its consequences for ‘soft’ measures, such as 
channel satisfaction (for two overview papers see Gaski 1984 and Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999). Other studies in this field have investigated conflicts 
from another perspective and focused on conflict prevention mechanisms and 
resolution techniques (e.g., Koza and Dant 2007; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Song, Xie, 
and Dyer 2000). Interestingly, prior studies typically consider the conflict a single-
faceted factor and do not distinguish between different conflict characteristics. 
However, the impact of conflict delistings on performance may be contingent upon 
specific conflict characteristics (Sloot and Verhoef 2008; Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). Empirical research which allows for a multi-
dimensional approach unraveling the conditions in which the performance 
consequences of conflict (delistings) are more or less harmful is missing.  
1.2.3 Gap #3: How to Respond to Conflict Delistings?  
Companies often rely on managerial actions such as advertising support and price 
reductions to attract consumers (e.g., Grover and Srinivasan 1992; Srinivasan et al. 
2004). In traditional retail settings, increasing advertising support and engaging in price 
reductions increase manufacturer and retailer sales (e.g., Bijmolt, Van Heerde, and 
Pieters 2005; Sethuraman, Tellis, and Briesch 2011). However, the effectiveness of 
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managerial actions changes considerably when faced with a crisis situation (Van 
Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). In some crisis situations, a particular marketing 
action may be highly efficient, while in other situations, the same action renders 
ineffective in attracting consumers (Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2012) or might 
even backfire. Accordingly, the effectiveness of strategic actions, such as advertising 
support and price reductions, is likely to be different when the manufacturer and 
retailer face a conflict delisting compared to ‘normal’ situations, given the intrinsic 
characteristics of a conflict delisting (e.g., change in brand equity due to the conflict 
delisting, presence of publicity surrounding the conflict, attribution of blame by 
consumers). However, empirical evidence on this topic is missing, leaving companies in 
the dark about the appropriate response to a conflict delisting.  
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION 
The objective of this dissertation is to help fill the three identified gaps by answering 
the following questions.  
1.3.1 What are the Performance Implications of Conflict Delistings? 
Two different perspectives shed light on this question. In Chapter 2, a consumer 
perspective will provide insights into the sales consequences of conflict delistings for 
both manufacturers and retailers. A large sample of conflict situations will be analysed, 
allowing for empirical generalizations on the consequences of conflict delistings. 
Chapter 3 takes an investor perspective, in which the impact of conflict delistings 
on shareholder value is examined. Shareholder value is forward looking (Geyskens, 
Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002) and a reflection of all future changes in cash flows 
(Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1992). Therefore, the change in shareholder value 
captures the full impact of conflict delistings on firm value, including consumer 
reactions, expected change in profit margins, reactions from other negotiation 
partners, and potential damages in the manufacturer-retailer relationship.  
1.3.2 In Which Situations are the Performance Consequences More or Less Severe? 
This dissertation will consider conflict as a heterogeneous concept, and distinguish 
between different conflict characteristics. Both in Chapter 2 and 3, contingency 
frameworks will be developed that specify conditions under which performance 
consequences of conflict delistings will be more or less severe. To exemplify, the 
contingency frameworks provide insights into the contingency role of the publicity 
surrounding the delisting, the initiator of the delisting, and the number of products 
that are delisted. 
Chapter 1 
8 
1.3.3 Which Strategy is Beneficial to Alleviate Negative Consequences of a Conflict 
Delisting?   
Chapter 2 will shed light on the effectiveness of various strategic actions (i.e., 
advertising support and price reductions) that manufacturers and retailers can use to 
protect themselves from the potentially harmful consequences of conflict delistings.  
1.4 OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE  
The objective of this dissertation is to unravel the performance implications of conflict 
delistings. To this end, I composed a unique and extensive database comprising all 
conflict delistings from 2000-2016 in four European countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany, 
The Netherlands, United Kingdom). The data was collected by means of an extensive 
media search in trade press sources and national newspapers. This multitude of cases - 
spanning different countries, categories, manufacturers, and retailers - does not only 
allow for empirical generalizations on the performance consequences of conflict 
delistings, the variability between the cases also provides insights into the potential 
contingent impact of various conflict characteristics such as the initiator of the conflict 
and the publicity around the conflict delisting. This database is the input for two 
empirical studies dedicated to the objective. Both chapters tackle the issue from a 
different perspective, thereby providing a well-rounded picture into the impact of 
conflict delistings. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the two essays. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2: The Effectiveness of Managerial Actions during Conflict Delistings 
Chapter 2 focusses on consumer reactions to conflict delistings. Conflict delistings 
significantly disrupt consumers’ usual shopping behaviour. Due to the unavailability of 
the product, consumers are forced to alter their shopping behaviour, and have to 
decide whether to visit a different store to purchase the delisted product (and possible 
other products) or to select a different product within the involved retailer (e.g., Sloot 
and Verhoef 2008). The former will harm a retailer’s sales, while the latter will 
negatively influence a manufacturer. I utilize and build upon Heider’s balance theory 
(1958) and postulate that who a consumer sides with will depend on the managerial 
actions of the conflicting parties (i.e., advertising support and price reductions) and the 
specific conflict situation (i.e., initiator of the conflict and amount of publicity 
surrounding the conflict). Subsequently, I theorize and test in which conflict situations 
which managerial actions are more effective. The results of the study will therefore 
provide a marketing dashboard guiding both manufacturers and retailers on which 
marketing actions are more effective in different types of conflict situations. 
 
Introduction 
9 
Table 1.2: General Overview of Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Research question Which marketing actions are best suited 
in which particular conflict situation to 
mitigate potential losses resulting from 
conflict delistings? 
How do conflict delistings influence firm 
value, and how is the performance impact 
of conflict delistings contingent upon the 
seriousness of the conflict and the 
capacity to withstand negative 
consequences? 
Research perspective Consumer responses  Investor responses 
Performance measure Brand and category sales Shareholder value 
Sample 187 cases in brand sales model &  
577 cases in category sales model,  
period 2001 – 2015,  
four European countries 
69 cases of listed companies,  
period 2000 – 2016,  
four European countries 
Data types Advertising data, household scanner 
data, newspaper databases, trade press 
sources 
Annual reports, financial databases, 
newspaper databases  
Methodology Market response model Event study methodology 
1.4.2 Chapter 3: The Market Valuation of Conflict Delistings 
Chapter 3 takes an investor perspective to conflict delistings. Besides consumer 
reactions, conflict delistings might influence firm value through its effects on profit 
margins and changes in the manufacturer-retailer relationship (Sloot and Verhoef 
2008), and even negotiations with other marketing channel partners. I unify these 
effects and investigate the impact of conflict delistings on total firm value. 
Subsequently, I build a contingency model to investigate in which conflict situations 
conflict delistings will be more or less harmful. I distinguish between the seriousness of 
the delisting (i.e., elimination size and amount of publicity surrounding the delisting) 
and the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of the delisting (i.e., 
initiating party, firm size focal firm, and firm size opponent). 
1.5 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is based on two empirical studies described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
While they share the common theme of conflict delistings and its impact on firm 
performance, they differ in their underlying perspectives and emphasis. Chapter 2 
focusses on consumer reactions to conflict delistings, and the subsequent managerial 
actions that are most suitable in an array of conflict situations. Chapter 3 investigates 
the impact of conflict delistings on firm value, by examining investor responses around 
the conflict announcement. Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes the findings and provides a 
general conclusion to the dissertation, discusses the main managerial implications, and 
offers suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
The Effectiveness of Managerial Actions 
during Conflict Delistings 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
While bargaining power clearly used to be on the manufacturer’s side a few decades 
ago, retailers have grown into large, concentrated players which make them a 
powerful counterparty for manufacturers (Dawar and Stornelli 2013). This change of 
balance of power can turn negotiations into true power conflicts (Hingley 2005; Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995). A prevalent instrument for resolving conflicts is the use 
of coercive power (Frazier and Summers 1984), where the manufacturer or retailer 
may decide to delist the afflicted brands from the retailer’s assortment. We refer to 
this phenomenon as conflict delistings. To exemplify, retailer Tesco removed at least 
160 Premier Foods products from the shelves due to a pricing spat (The Grocer 2011c), 
while manufacturer giant Unilever decided to cease the delivery of their butter brand 
to popular German retailer Rewe (Lebensmittelzeitung 2013). While the use of 
coercive power in the form of conflict delistings might be effective in gaining 
compliance from the other party (Frazier and Summers 1984), they can seriously harm 
both manufacturer and retailer sales, due to consumers switching to alternative 
brands within the store and consumers switching between stores, respectively (Van 
der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017).  
In light of these potential devastating consequences, both manufacturers and 
retailers rely heavily on their advertising and price actions in an attempt to protect 
themselves from the damaging effects. For instance, when beer brand Paulaner was 
delisted from popular German supermarkets Real and Extra, it started a huge poster 
campaign to induce consumers to switch stores (Lebensmittelzeitung 2007), while 
Coca-Cola offered price promotions for Fanta at other retailers when it was delisted 
from Superunie in The Netherlands (Distrifood 2005b). In addition to differences in the 
use of the advertising and price actions, there is also a lot of heterogeneity between 
different conflict situations. For example, whereas some conflicts are widely covered in 
top national newspapers (e.g., Albert Heijn – Coca-Cola conflict in 2007 which was 
covered in 90% of the national newspapers), others receive little to no publicity (e.g., 
Sainsbury – Pepsi conflict in 2011 which was not covered in any of the national 
newspapers). Furthermore, the conflict can be initiated by either the manufacturer, for 
example by demanding higher prices, or by the retailer, for example by trying to 
decrease wholesale prices. Despite the potential tremendous impact of a conflict 
delisting on manufacturer and retailer sales, both parties are clueless on the 
appropriate course of action when confronted with such an event. 
Despite the inherent managerial importance, current research offers little guidance 
on this issue (Sloot and Verhoef 2008; Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 
2017). While Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren (2017) study the market 
share consequences of a particular conflict delisting in different categories, they do not 
study the effectiveness of advertising and price to mitigate the potential negative 
consequences of the delisting. We draw upon balance theory (Heider 1958) to provide 
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insights into the effectiveness of these marketing actions in different conflict delisting 
circumstances. This theory posits that, to fulfill the need for internal balance (Heider 
1958), consumers will side with either the manufacturer or retailer when these parties 
are faced with a conflict delisting, thereby influencing their sales numbers. However, 
until now, studies using balance theory remain agnostic with regard to how exactly 
consumers make the decision to choose one side over the other, i.e., whether parties 
can persuade the consumer with their marketing actions or whether the choice is 
completely context-dependent.  
We compose a unique and extensive database on conflict delistings that occurred 
between 2001 and 2013 in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
Belgium. We observe the sales consequences for afflicted manufacturers and retailers 
in the context of conflict delistings for 187 affected brands and 577 affected retailer 
categories. Included categories range from toilet paper to cleaning products, soups, 
and olive oils. We use market response models to investigate the impact of the 
conflict, marketing actions (i.e., advertising and price), conflict characteristics (i.e., 
publicity and initiator), and their interaction effects on manufacturer and retailer sales.  
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we contribute to and expand 
Heider’s balance theory (1958). In marketing, balance theory is mainly used in the 
context of sponsorship arrangements (e.g., Mazodier and Merunka 2012), gift giving 
(e.g., Lowrey, Otnes, and Ruth 2004), sales employee-consumer relationships (e.g., 
Frey, Bayón, and Totzek 2013), and business-to-business relationships (e.g., Peterson 
2006). As such, balance theory is mainly used to explain the occurrence of a spillover 
effect from one relationship to another (e.g., a sponsorship with a favorite celebrity 
leads to an increased brand image). However, the basis on which a consumer chooses 
one party over another in case of disruptions of the balance is unclear. We aim to fill 
this gap by investigating how the use of persuasion techniques by either involved party 
(i.e., advertising and price decisions by the manufacturer and retailer) can influence 
this decision. In addition, although Heider (1958) pointed at the relevance of the 
contextual factors attribution and awareness of the event, there is no empirical 
evidence substantiating these claims. Since we will study the effect of the amount of 
publicity surrounding the conflict and the initiator of the conflict, we contribute to this 
theory. 
Second, previous research identified managerial actions (e.g., advertising and price) 
as important tools for companies to persuade consumers to purchase a manufacturer’s 
brand (e.g., Srinivasan et al. 2004) or visit a retailer’s store (e.g., Grover and Srinivasan 
1992). However, the effectiveness of marketing actions changes considerably when 
consumers are faced with a crisis situation (Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). 
Consequently, given the intrinsic characteristics of conflict delistings, the effectiveness 
of advertising and price decisions are likely to work differently from ‘normal’ 
situations. Surprisingly, no empirical evidence is available on the effectiveness of these 
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managerial actions during conflict delistings (Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and 
Cleeren 2017). 
Third, in addition to persuasive techniques, contextual factors (i.e., conflict 
characteristics) may play a large role when consumers decide who to side with (Heider 
1958). While there is an extensive literature stream concerning inter-organizational 
conflicts providing insights into the antecedents (e.g., Gaski 1984) and consequences 
of conflicts (e.g., Lusch 1976), as well as prevention and resolution methods (e.g., Koza 
and Dant 2007; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Song, Xie, and Dyer 2000), these studies do 
not distinguish between different conflict contexts. A more heterogeneous approach, 
in which a distinction is made between different conflict characteristics, is clearly 
needed. Therefore, we follow Heider’s (1958) recommendation and investigate the 
impact of awareness (i.e., publicity) and causal attribution (i.e., the initiator of the 
conflict).  
Finally, the importance of identifying boundary conditions for existing theory has 
been emphasized (Whetten 1989). More specifically, previous research points at the 
relevance of finding these boundary conditions for the advertising and pricing 
literature (Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). However, empirical evidence in 
this area is scarce. We therefore analyze whether the effectiveness of advertising and 
price depends on the conflict situation, i.e., the amount of publicity and the initiator of 
the conflict. The results of the study create a marketing dashboard, providing 
guidelines for both manufacturers and retailers on which marketing actions to use in 
which particular conflict situation to mitigate potential losses resulting from conflict 
delistings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature 
on manufacturer-retailer power and the role of the consumer in this relationship. In 
particular, we draw upon Heider’s (1958) balance theory as the basis of our conceptual 
framework. Then, we introduce the hypotheses, describe the methodology and data, 
and present the results. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications, 
and provide limitations of our study and fruitful directions for future research.  
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The nature of interaction between manufacturers and retailers has received a vast 
amount of attention in the last 20 years (Ailawadi et al. 2010). In these last decades, 
the manufacturer-retailer relationship has been subject to substantial structural 
changes. In the past, manufacturers clearly dominated the retailing landscape, which 
allowed them to enforce their prices and buying conditions on the typically small 
retailers. Throughout the decades, a shift in power has taken place due to the rise of 
store brands (Ailawadi 2001; Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010), availability of 
scanner data (Chu and Messinger 1998), scarcity in shelf space (Ailawadi, Borin, and 
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Farris 1995), pass-through of trade promotions (Ailawadi et al. 2010), and the growing 
consolidation of retail chains (Aalto-Setälä 2002; Dawar and Stornelli 2012; Messinger 
and Narasimhan 1995). Retailers have now grown to be players of significant size, 
leading to a different power balance in the retailing market. On the one hand, 
manufacturers can leverage their ownership of national brands. As retailers depend on 
national brands to generate store traffic, manufacturers have negotiation power over 
retailers (Shankar, Carpenter, and Farley 2012). On the other hand, retailers ultimately 
decide which brands to carry in their assortment (Dukes, Geylani, and Srinivasan 2009), 
giving them negotiation power over the manufacturer. In a conflict situation, both 
parties may attempt to exert their power, by means of a temporary delisting of 
products, in an attempt to influence the other’s behavior. This negative, adversarial 
manufacturer-retailer relationship should not be considered in isolation. Rather, the 
effects of conflict delistings may be better understood if the relationships beyond the 
dyadic level are studied. Indeed, power abuse in the form of conflict delistings by 
either the manufacturer or retailer affects not only the conflicting parties (i.e., the 
involved manufacturer and retailer) but also consumers, implying that different 
relational dynamics are in place. To discuss these relational dynamics, we draw upon 
balance theory (Heider 1958). 
According to balance theory, triadic relationships can either be balanced or 
unbalanced. A balanced triadic relationship is characterized by either three positive 
relations or one positive and two negative relations within the triad. In our research 
context, a balanced state occurs in the absence of a conflict delisting because the 
triadic relationship consists of three positive relations (see Figure 2.1, Panel A): the 
retailer carries the particular brand from the manufacturer (positive), and the 
consumer purchases the manufacturer’s brand (positive) at the retailer (positive). An 
unbalanced triadic relationship, on the other hand, is characterized by either two 
positive and one negative relation or three negative relations. When a conflict 
escalates to the point that brands are delisted, an unbalanced triadic relationship 
arises. Indeed, the positive manufacturer-retailer relationship turns into a negative one 
(see Figure 2.1, Panel B). 
The basic premise of balance theory is that people have an internal need for a 
congruent or balanced state within a triad (Heider 1958). Individuals who find 
themselves in an unbalanced state will experience psychological tension, which may 
lead to stress and reduced well-being (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002) and, thus, are 
expected to change their attitudes, actions, or relations to move toward a balanced 
state. Thus, in the context of conflict delistings, consumers have to adjust their 
relationship with either the manufacturer or the retailer in order to return to a 
balanced state. More specifically, when faced with a conflict delisting, consumers can 
switch to a different store in order to obtain the manufacturer brand (choosing to side 
with the manufacturer) or to a different brand within the store (choosing to side with 
the retailer). 
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Figure 2.1: Heider’s Balance Theory 
Where “M” denotes manufacturer, “R” retailer, and “C” consumer. 
 
The ultimate choice depends on the ratio between the costs of switching brands and 
the costs of switching stores, and manufacturers and retailers are free to alter the 
balance in their favor (Thain and Bradley 2012). They induce switching behavior by 
extrinsic incentives or marketing actions. In particular, both manufacturers and 
retailers attempt to alleviate brand- and category-sales losses by increasing advertising 
support or by offering price discounts. Our main objective is to find out in which 
situations which managerial actions are more effective. We therefore develop formal 
hypotheses for the various interaction effects. For the main effects of the marketing 
actions and conflict characteristics, we briefly review prior literature and include them 
in our empirical model.  
The literature is divided as to whether advertising support alleviates sales losses 
resulting from conflict delistings. On the one hand, advertising may amplify the 
occurrence of the conflict delisting and, in turn, aggravate the damage caused by the 
delisting (Liu and Shankar 2015). Moreover, as a conflict delisting indicates a lack of 
ability and willingness to deliver certain products to consumers, the manufacturer’s 
and retailer’s credibility is likely to be harmed (Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 
2007). As credibility is a crucial requirement for companies to get consumers to believe 
their advertising claims (Goldberg and Hartwick 1990), advertising efforts are 
hampered if company credibility is harmed (Aaker 1991; Goldberg and Hartwick 1990). 
On the other hand, advertising informs consumers about the existence of the conflict 
delisting and provides information on the availability of the delisted products at other 
retailers or information on available, alternative products at the same retailer. Further, 
the conflict delisting may increase the awareness of the afflicted brand and retailer 
(Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), making advertising more effective during a 
conflict situation. 
+/-+/-+ +
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Also the effect of price discounts on brand and category sales is ambivalent at the 
time of a conflict delisting. On the one hand, it could be argued that price discounts 
reduce the manufacturer’s and retailer’s credibility - on top of the credibility loss 
inherent to conflict delistings. On the other hand, conflict delistings make consumers 
more price sensitive for several reasons. First, conflict delistings generally place a lot of 
emphasis on prices, as they typically occur due to price negations gone sour. Second, 
negative information about manufacturers or retailers may increase price sensitivity 
(Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). Further, 
the reduced manufacturer’s and retailer’s credibility increase information search and 
processing costs, which in turn may increase price sensitivity (Erdem, Swait, and 
Louviere 2002; Lynch and Ariely 2000). The heightened price awareness and sensitivity 
of consumers may make price discounts more effective (Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and 
Pauwels 2008). In addition, consumers may perceive price discounts as a financial 
compensation for the conflict situation. Previous research indicates that financial 
compensation has a positive effect on the level of satisfaction after a failure in general 
(Folkes 1984) and may offset any negative reactions that a consumer may have in case 
of product unavailability (Anderson, Fitzsimons, and Simester 2006), making price 
discounts an effective marketing instrument in case of a conflict delisting.        
The extent to which advertising support and price discounts are effective in 
alleviating sales losses resulting from conflict delistings is likely to be contingent on the 
specific conflict situation. Previous studies have shown that the effectiveness of 
marketing actions is dependent on situational characteristics (e.g., Cleeren, Van 
Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). In a similar vein, we argue that the effectiveness of 
advertising support and price reductions is contingent upon the amount of publicity 
surrounding the conflict delisting and the initiator of the conflict. This is in line with 
Heider (1958) who identified awareness of the event and causal attribution as 
important factors when evaluating heteronomous events, such as conflict delistings. 
Therefore, we include publicity and conflict initiator as key conflict characteristics.  
Publicity represents an environmental effect that increases the awareness of the 
conflict delisting. It refers to earned media or media that a company does not directly 
generate themselves (Stephen and Gallak 2012), such as press mentions in national 
newspapers. Although conflict delistings are covered extensively in the independent 
press, little attention has been paid to how publicity affect advertising and pricing 
effectiveness in alleviating sales losses from conflict delistings.  
The conflict can be initiated by either the manufacturer or the retailer, which may 
influence the causal attribution of the event. Manufacturers often initiate a conflict 
delisting if retailers do not accept the demand for higher wholesale prices for their 
products. To exemplify, in 2009 German mineral water manufacturer Gerolsteiner 
demanded higher wholesale prices from retailer Real. When Real refused to agree with 
this demand, Gerolsteiner initiated a conflict delisting (Lebensmittelzeitung 2009). 
Retailers can put their foot down and cause a conflict as well, for example if buying 
The Effectiveness of Managerial Actions during Conflict Delistings 
19 
conditions are not improved (Sloot and Verhoef 2008), by demanding a lower 
wholesale price from the manufacturer (Distrifood 2005c), or by pressuring the 
manufacturer after a stunt with price reductions at hard discounters 
(Lebensmittelzeitung 2004). 
We theorize and test how the effectiveness of advertising support and price 
discounts is affected by the conflict situation, i.e., publicity and initiator of the conflict. 
Figure 2.2 summarizes our conceptual framework. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual Framework 
2.2.1 The Effectiveness of Marketing Actions and Publicity 
Conflict delistings are often accompanied by publicity (Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, 
and Cleeren 2017). Media provide negative information about brands and companies 
by making consumers aware of the adversarial relationship between the involved 
manufacturer and retailer. 
Advertising and publicity. People have the natural tendency to place more trust in 
messages from independent media compared to advertisement campaigns due to 
higher source credibility (e.g., Eisend and Küster 2011; Lord and Putrevu 1993). Since 
negative publicity has higher source credibility than the advertising it is paired with 
(Stammerjohan et al. 2005) and negative information is given more weight than 
positive information (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000), we propose that 
advertising effectiveness is lower for conflict delistings that receive publicity than for 
conflicts that receive little or no publicity.  
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Moreover, according to contrast theory, when consumers are exposed to either 
advertising or publicity that delivers inconsistent information, the combined effect will 
be much more negative than the publicity-only (Kim, Yoon, and Lee 2010) or 
advertising-only condition (Smith and Vogt 1995). Thus, while manufacturers and 
retailers allocate advertising budgets with the goal of spreading positive information 
(e.g., availability of brands at other retailers, availability of alternative brands within 
the retailer), publicity, which is negative in nature when a conflict occurs, renders 
advertising support less effective. We therefore hypothesize: 
H1: When a conflict is surrounded by publicity, advertising becomes less effective 
for both a) the manufacturer, and b) the retailer, compared to when the 
conflict is not surrounded by publicity 
Price and publicity. Negative publicity may decrease the perceived differentiation of 
the affected brand or retailer (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000). Indeed, due to 
the conflict delisting, consumers are forced to compare alternative brands within the 
category or switch to an alternative retailer, which could lead to an increase in the 
magnitude of the brands’ or retailers’ price elasticity (Cleeren, Van Heerde, and 
Dekimpe 2013; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). In addition, publicity 
increases the awareness of a conflict (Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015) 
including the underlying cause, prevailingly price negotiations that gone sour. Previous 
literature reveals that price conflicts (i.e., price wars) make consumers more price 
sensitive (Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2008), indicating consumers are more 
likely to purchase a product when the price is lower (Tellis 1988). Therefore, price 
reductions are more effective when the conflict delisting receives publicity. We 
hypothesize:  
H2: When a conflict is surrounded by publicity, price reductions become more 
effective for both a) the manufacturer, and b) the retailer, compared to when 
the conflict is not surrounded by publicity 
2.2.2 The Effectiveness of Marketing Actions and the Initiator of the Conflict 
Consumers perceive a conflict delisting as an event that violates a norm. Indeed, a 
conflict or unavailability causes irritation amongst consumers (Sloot, Verhoef, and 
Franses 2005) as they are forced to alter their usual shopping behavior. Additionally, 
they believe that the manufacturer or retailer is causally linked to the norm violation. 
In other words, they hold either the manufacturer or retailer responsible for the 
conflict delisting. Because consumers detect a conflict delisting and determine that 
either the manufacturer or retailer caused the conflict delisting, blame emerges (cf. 
Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe 2014). Causal attribution theory dictates that 
consumers assign blame to the party that is responsible for the failure (Folkes 1984), in 
this case the firm that initiated the conflict. Attribution of blame forms the basis of 
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consumers’ judgments and behavior (Klein and Dawar 2004), rendering advertising 
support and price reductions more or less effective. 
Advertising and conflict initiator. Advertising support is less effective for the 
initiating party of the conflict, for two reasons. First, because the conflict initiator is 
blamed, its credibility will be hurt, resulting in reduced brand equity (Erdem and Swait 
1998). As a consequence, advertising effectiveness will be hampered (Aaker 1991; 
Goldberg and Hartwick 1990; Van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2007). Second, while 
the conflict initiator is willing to demonstrate its sympathy with its consumers through 
advertising, consumers may question the trustworthiness and feel skepticism and 
suspicion (cf. Priester and Petty 2003). Allocating large budgets to advertising spending 
while at the same time initiating a conflict delisting to bargain for lower prices may be 
perceived as inconsistent. Hence, this may run the risk of reducing consumer 
trustworthiness and decrease the effectiveness of the advertising campaign.  
On the contrary, advertising support is more effective for the non-initiating party. 
When a consumer blames one party they implicitly choose to side with the other party, 
due to their inner need for a balanced state (e.g., Heider 1958). Thus, the non-initiating 
party will not lose credibility and its advertising claims are perceived as trustworthy, 
rendering advertising support more effective. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H3:  When the focal company initiated the conflict delisting, advertising becomes 
a) less effective for the focal company, and b) more effective for the 
opponent, compared to when the focal company did not initiate the conflict 
delisting. 
Price and conflict initiator. Consumers believe that problems arising from firms’ actions 
should be solved by firms (Folkes 1988). Thus, consumers feel they deserve financial 
compensation and apologies from the initiator of the conflict (Folkes 1984). Price 
discounts are a way to (financially) compensate the consumer for the inconvenience 
caused by the conflict delisting (Anderson, Fitzsimons, and Simester 2006; Folkes 
1984), making price an effective marketing tool to alleviating sales losses for the 
conflict initiator. Additionally, the reduced credibility from initiating a conflict further 
increases the effectiveness of price discounts (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). In 
contrast, the credibility of a non-initiating party may increase due to a conflict 
delisting, rendering price reductions less effective (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). 
We hypothesize:  
H4 When the focal company initiated the conflict delisting, price reductions 
become a) more effective for the focal company, and b) less effective for the 
opponent, compared to when the focal company did not initiate the conflict 
delisting. 
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2.3 MODEL 
We study the effects of marketing actions, conflict characteristics, and the interactions 
between these on manufacturer and retailer sales in the context of a conflict delisting.  
2.3.1 Model Specification 
To estimate the impact on manufacturer and retailer performance, we estimate one 
model for brand sales (BS) and one for category sales (CS), respectively. We use two 
market response models to assess the impact of the marketing actions, conflict 
characteristics, and the interaction effects. We model the (normalized)1 brand sales for 
the afflicted brand in the afflicted category (hereafter referred to as brand-category 
combination b) and week t as follows: 
 
ܤܵ௕௧∗                  = ߚଵ஻ௌܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௕௧                                    
+  ߚଶ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௕௧            
+  ߚଷ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௕௧                  
+  ߚସ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௕௧ ∗ ܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௕௧     
+  ߚହ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௕௧ ∗ ܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௕௧               
+  ߚ଺஻ௌܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௕௧  + ߚ଻஻ௌ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௕௧  
+ ߚ஻଼ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௕௧ ∗  ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௕௧
+ ߚଽ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௕௧ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௕௧ 
+  ߚଵ଴஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௕௧ ∗ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௕௧ 
+  ߚଵଵ஻ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܾݎܽ݊݀ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௕௧ ∗ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௕௧                                       
+  ߚଵଶ஻ௌ ଵܺ௕௧  + ߙ௕஻ௌ + ߝ௕௧஻ௌ 
 
where Start delisting is a dummy variable indicating whether the week falls in the 
period before (=0) or after the start of the delisting (=1). The X1bt vector includes the 
control variables elimination size, brand equity, trend, and seasonal and holiday 
dummy variables. The ߙ௕஻ௌ captures the unobserved per-case time-constant effects 
(e.g., Woolridge 2002). Finally, ߝ௕௧஻ௌ depicts the idiosyncratic error term.  
Similar to the brand sales model, the (normalized) category sales model for the 
afflicted category of the afflicted retailer (hereafter referred to as retailer-category 
combination c) and week t is specified as follows: 
                                                                
1 To allow for comparison between categories, we make our dependent variable unit free by dividing sales by 
the average weekly sales in the year before the delisting (cf. Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Van 
der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017), see data section.  
(1) 
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ܥܵ௖௧∗                   = ߚଵ஼ௌܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௖௧                                     
+  ߚଶ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௖௧
+ ߚଷ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௧       
+  ߚସ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௖௧ ∗ ܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௖௧  
+ ߚହ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௧ ∗ ܵݐܽݎݐ ݈݀݁݅ݏݐ݅݊݃௖௧           
+  ߚ଺஼ௌܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௖௧  + ߚ଻஼ௌ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௖௧  
+ ߚ஼଼ௌܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௖௧ ∗  ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௖௧
+ ߚଽ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௧ ∗ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௖௧
+ ߚଵ଴஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ܽ݀ݒ݁ݎݐ݅ݏ݅݊݃௖௧ ∗ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௖௧ 
+  ߚଵଵ஼ௌ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ܿܽݐ݁݃݋ݎݕ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௖௧ ∗ ܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௖௧                                 
+  ߚଵଶ ஼ௌܺଶ௖௧  + ߙ௖஼ௌ + ߝ௖௧஼ௌ 
 
Similar to X1bt, the X2ct vector includes the control variables elimination size, brand 
equity, trend, and seasonal and holiday dummy variables. ߙ௖஼ௌ captures the 
unobserved time-constant effects that affect category sales of the different conflict 
cases (e.g., Woolridge 2002), while ߝ௖௧஼ௌ depicts the idiosyncratic error term. 
2.3.2 Endogeneity  
Advertising, price, and the interactions involving these marketing variables might be 
endogenous to the models as it is possible that brand and category managers employ 
these actions only when they expect higher sales performance. As a result, the error 
term may be correlated with the regressors causing inconsistent estimates (e.g., 
Ebbes, Papies, and Van Heerde 2011). To accommodate the potential endogeneity of 
advertising, price, and the interaction effects involving these marketing actions, we 
estimate equations 1 and 2 with 2SLS. We use three broad categories of instrumental 
variables (IVs): advertising and price of similar but different markets, cost-related 
variables, and interactions between the established IVs with the conflict characteristics 
publicity and initiator. Table 2.1 summarizes the main IVs used and indicates the 
operationalization and data sources.  
  
(2) 
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Table 2.1: Operationalizations and Data Sources of IVs 
IV Operationalization Data source 
Price unrelated product 
classes in same country  
Weekly average of the weighted average 
lagged prices of the four unrelated product 
classes, in the country the delisting took 
place.  
GfK Netherlands,  
GfK Belgium, 
GfK Germany,  
Kantar Worldpanel UK household-
panel data 
Price afflicted product 
class in other countries 
Weekly weighted average prices of the 
afflicted product class, averaged over the 
three unrelated countries. 
GfK Netherlands, 
GfK Belgium, 
GfK Germany, 
Kantar Worldpanel UK household-
panel data 
Advertising unrelated 
product classes in same 
country  
Lagged weekly average advertising of the 
four unrelated product classes, in the 
country the delisting took place. 
AC Nielsen 
Advertising afflicted 
product class in other 
countries 
Weekly average advertising of the afflicted 
product class, averaged over the three 
unrelated countries. 
AC Nielsen 
Unit labor costs Country-specific average cost of labor per 
unit of output produced. Measured in 
percentage changes compared to the same 
period in the previous year. 
Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 
 
Following Nevo’s (2001) recommendation, we instrument the marketing actions by 
using instruments from similar but different markets. We do this in two different ways. 
First, in line with Van Heerde et al. (2013) we include lagged price and advertising 
measures for unrelated product classes in the same country. Theoretically, these IVs 
have the same underlying cost structure that determine changes in advertising and 
price, while being uncorrelated with demand shocks for the focal product class (Van 
Heerde et al. 2013). Second, we include the advertising and price measures for the 
afflicted product class in geographically distant markets as IVs (see Rooderkerk, Van 
Heerde, and Bijmolt 2013 and Sotgiu and Gielens 2015 for similar practices). 
Advertising and price measures of different regions will have the same underlying cost 
structure as our focal region, and can therefore be used as valid instruments. As the 
conflict delistings occur on a national level, we use the average of the weighted 
average advertising and price for the three other countries in our dataset as the 
geographically distant regions as they will not be influenced by the potential demand 
shock in the focal region. To further capture the development of underlying cost 
structures for prices, we use the unit labor costs as an IV. Labor cost has been widely 
used to instrument prices, and has been proven to be a valid and reliable instrument 
(see for example Chintagunta, Kadiyali, and Vilcassim 2006). As the interactions 
between the exogenous conflict characteristics (i.e., publicity and initiator) and our 
endogenous variables advertising and price are by definition also endogenous, the 
interaction terms between the IVs and publicity and the initiator are also valid 
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instruments (Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013; Van Heerde et al. 2013). 
Similarly, we also add interaction terms between the exogenous dummy indicating the 
start of the delisting and the IVs for advertising and price. We offer more details on the 
exact operationalization of the variables in the “Data” section. 
2.4 DATA 
To investigate the impact of conflict delistings on manufacturer and retailer sales, we 
use a unique dataset from different sources. We use a two-step data collection 
approach. In the first step, we identified all conflict delistings that occurred in The 
Netherlands (between 2002-2012), United Kingdom (between 2006-2012), Belgium 
(between 2006-2012), and Germany (between 2004-2012).2 The data was collected by 
means of an extensive search in the trade press sources in that particular country.3 To 
be selected into the sample, the delisting needed to fulfill two criteria. First, the 
delisting should be caused by a conflict between a manufacturer and a retailer. 
Second, we only included conflict delistings that occurred in the area of grocery 
retailing (thereby excluding those that took place in other retailing areas, such as 
hardware stores).  
In step 2, we obtained purchase data, advertising data, and information on the 
selected conflict characteristics. We obtained household panel data for these conflict 
delistings from GfK Netherlands (gross panel size=5,750 households), Kantar 
Worldpanel UK (gross panel size=25,000 households), GfK Belgium (gross panel 
size=5,100 households), and GfK Germany (gross panel size=27,000 households). We 
purchased advertising expenditures for all relevant brands and retailers from AC 
Nielsen. Furthermore, we obtained information on conflict characteristics through an 
extensive media search on the specific conflict delistings in the (country-specific) 
national newspapers using the LexisNexis (Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany), 
GoPress and the PressBanking databases (Belgium).4 To obtain reliable estimates for 
                                                                
2 The sample period between countries is different due to the availability of data.    
3 Main trade press sources for the different countries are the following: Distrifood (The Netherlands), The 
Grocer, Marketing Magazine, and Marketing Week (United Kingdom), Gondola and RetailDetail (Belgium), 
and Lebensmittelzeitung (Germany). 
4 We limited our media search to newspapers with a circulation of at least 1% of the population. This 
includes, for the United Kingdom, both the weekly and Sunday editions of (in alphabetical order) Daily Mail, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Star, The Daily Telegraph, The Express, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The i, The 
Independent, News of the World, The Observer, The People, The Sun, and The Times, for a total of 18 
newspapers. For the Netherlands, we included AD/Algemeen Dagblad, Het Financiële Dagblad, Nederlands 
Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, Het Parool, De Pers, Reformatorisch Dagblad, De Telegraaf, Trouw, and De 
Volkskrant. For Flanders, we included Gazet van Antwerpen, Het Laatste Nieuws, Metro, De Morgen, Het 
Nieuwsblad, De Standaard, and De Tijd. For Wallonia, we included L’Avenir, La Dernière Heure, L’Echo, La 
Libre, Metro, and Le Soir. For Germany, this included Focus, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Rundschau, Der 
Standard, Die Tageszeitung, die Welt, and Die Zeit. Except for Belgium, free newspapers are not part of the 
electronic databases, and thus, we could not include them in the media search. 
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the effectiveness of the marketing variables and the impact of conflict characteristics, 
we need a sufficiently long period before and after the delistings to ensure that we 
observe enough purchases in both periods. In line with Gielens and Steenkamp (2007), 
and given that we study frequently purchased consumer goods with different 
interpurchase times (Cleeren, van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), we gathered all data 
one year before, during, and one year after the delisting.5  
In total, we identified 187 brands delisted in different categories in at least one 
retailer and 577 delistings in categories at different retailers that fulfilled the two 
criteria specified above.6 Note that one conflict situation can affect multiple brands in 
one category and multiple categories within one retailer. For example, in the Unilever-
Delhaize conflict (2009), the Unilever brands Axe and Rexona were both delisted in the 
deodorant category. In addition, in the Premier Foods-Tesco conflict (2011) a wide 
variety of categories were affected within Tesco, such as dry pasta, vinegar, and packet 
soup. The number of retailer-category cases is larger than the number of brand-
category cases since a brand can be delisted at multiple retailers of the same buying 
group at the same time. The cases involve a large range of conflict delistings, ranging 
from cereals to floor polish, and from mineral water to yoghurt.  
2.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Brand sales (BS) consist of the weekly brand sales in volume. To account for the fact 
that sales are measured in different volume units over different categories (e.g., 
kilograms, liters, units), we make our dependent variable unit free by dividing brand 
sales by the average weekly brand sales in the year before the delisting (cf. Cleeren, 
Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013): 
 
ܤܵ௧∗ = ஻ௌ೟
ቆ∑ ಳೄೞ
ೞసషఱమೞసషభ
ఱమ ቇ
, 
 
where subscript s denotes the week in the year before the delisting (i.e., when s equals 
-1 it denotes the week before the start of the delisting). In total, we have 20,970 
observations for the brand sales model. Category sales (CS) measure the total category 
volume per week at the afflicted retailer. To obtain a unit-free measure, we again 
divide it by the average in the year before the delisting: 
 
                                                                
5 In contrast to the start date, the end date of the delisting is not always mentioned in the trade press. To 
determine the end of the delisting, we take a closer look at the sales of the delisted brand within the 
involved retailer. We state that the delisting has ended when the brand sales of the delisted brand at the 
involved retailer are back at 80% of the average weekly level in the year before the delisting, after they 
dropped below the level of 80%. In the robustness section, we test the robustness of this method.  
6 To limit our attention to meaningful cases only, we excluded cases for which the afflicted variety was sold 
at the afflicted retailer group in less than 50% of the observed weeks before the delisting. 
(3) 
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ܥܵ௧∗ = ஼ௌ೟
ቆ∑ ಴ೄೞ
ೞసషఱమೞసషభ
ఱమ ቇ
, 
 
where subscript s denotes the week in the year before the delisting. In total, we have 
64,344 observations for the category sales model. Table 2.2 provides the definitions 
and summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables.  
2.4.2 Marketing Actions  
For the brand sales model, we specify relative brand price as the grand-mean centered 
(SKU market-share) weighted average price per volume unit in relation to the main 
players in the category, i.e., the (market-share) weighted average prices of the five 
main noninvolved competitors in the category and the involved brand itself. The 
weight of the competitors’ prices and involved brand in the denominator is 
determined by the market shares of the specific brand in the category in the year 
before the delisting. Since the prices are net prices, they also reflect possible discounts 
that the brands may have offered. Also the relative brand advertising is specified 
relative to the (market share) weighted average advertising of the five main 
noninvolved competitors and the involved brand and grand-mean centered.7 
Similarly, for the category sales model, relative category price depicts the grand-
mean centered weekly (SKU market share) weighted average price per volume unit in 
the specific category at the involved retailer, expressed relative to the (market-share) 
weighted average category price of the five largest noninvolved competing retailers 
and the involved retailer itself.  
The weights of the prices in the denominator are again determined by the market 
share of the retailers in the particular category in the year before the delisting. We 
identified the five largest noninvolved competitive retailers per country from the 
market shares of the retailers a year before the delisting, as reported by the 
Euromonitor database. Relative category advertising is measured by the grand-mean 
centered advertising of the involved retailer relative to the weighted average of the 
five largest noninvolved competing retailers and the retailer itself.  
 
  
                                                                
7 The monthly advertising data for the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium were converted into weekly 
data. First, the daily advertising was calculated (by dividing the monthly advertising by the days per month). 
Second, this number was multiplied by 7 to capture the weekly advertising spending. 
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2.4.3 Conflict Characteristics 
Conflict characteristics were retrieved by an extensive search in the national 
newspapers and trade press sources. Publicity is a dummy variable which indicates 
whether the involvement of the brand/retailer in the conflict delisting was mentioned 
in at least one of the (country-specific) national newspapers (see Cleeren, Van Heerde, 
and Dekimpe 2013 for a similar operationalization). The dummy variable equals zero 
before the start of the delisting, and equals one after the start of the delisting if there 
was publicity in the certain week for the particular brand/retailer (and remains zero 
otherwise). For the brand-category combinations, there was publicity surrounding 
afflicted brands in 2.75% of the weeks after the start of the conflict. For the retailer-
category combinations, publicity was generally a little bit higher, as there was media 
coverage for the afflicted retailer in 4.08% of the observed weeks after the start of the 
conflict. Across cases, 72.73% of the brand-category combinations were surrounded by 
publicity, compared to 81.28% of the retailer-category combinations. 
The conflict can either be initiated by the manufacturer or by the retailer. Initiator 
is a dummy variable, which equals zero before the start of the delisting, and takes the 
value 1 after the start of the delisting if the manufacturer initiated the conflict and 
remains zero otherwise. We hereby focus on the initiator of the focal conflict itself 
(i.e., the firm that demands more favorable conditions in the negotiation process), and 
not the initiator of the delisting. In total, 53% of the conflict situations were initiated 
by a manufacturer, affecting 63% of our brand-category and 51% of our retailer-
category combinations.  
2.4.4 Control Variables  
In both models, we control for the elimination size of the delisting by including a 
dummy variable that equals zero before the start of the delisting, and takes the value 
one after if the full brand is delisted, and stays zero otherwise (in line with Boatwright 
and Nunes 2001; 2004). We also include the pre-conflict brand equity as a control 
variable, as this might impact the brand and category sales during the delisting (Van 
der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). For the brand sales (category sales) 
model, this is the grand mean-centered market share of (all) the delisted brand in the 
afflicted category in the year before the delisting, over all retailers (for the particular 
retailer). Due to the time series characteristics of the data, we additionally control for 
the trend, and possible seasonal and holiday influences.8 As mentioned in the model 
section, start delisting is a dummy variable which takes 1 after the start of the 
                                                                
8 General holidays included are New Year, Good Friday, Easter, Whitsunday, Ascension, Christmas, and 
Valentine day. Country-specific holidays for the Netherlands are Sinterklaas and Queensday/Kingsday. For 
the UK the country-specific holidays include Early May, Spring Bank, Summer Bank, Royal wedding, and 
Queens Jubilee. For Belgium, these are All Hallows, National Holiday, Labour Day, OLV Ascension, and 
wapenstilstand. Finally, for Germany, we include Labour Day and Day of Unity as country-specific holidays. 
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delisting, and zero otherwise. More specifically, in line with Cleeren, Dekimpe, and 
Helsen (2008) the start of the delisting is the date mentioned on the delisting 
announcement. 
2.4.5 Instrumental Variables  
In line with Van Heerde et al. (2013), we distinguish between the product classes dairy 
food, non-dairy food, beverages, household care, and personal care to calculate the 
lagged advertising and price measures for unrelated product classes in the same 
country. For example, for a dairy brand, we use the average of the (SKU market share) 
weighted average lagged prices of the non-dairy food, beverage, household care, and 
personal care as an IV.  
We use the average of the (SKU market share) weighted average advertising and 
price for the three unrelated countries to instrument the afflicted product class in 
geographically distant markets (see Sotgiu and Gielens 2015 for similar practice). For 
example, for a delisting that occurred in the Netherlands, we use the average of the 
(SKU market share) weighted average prices for that particular product class in the UK, 
Germany, and Belgium as an instrument.  
 We obtained the unit labor costs via the Organization of Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). Labor costs are defined as the average costs of labor per 
unit produced, and are measured in percentage change relative to the same period in 
the previous year. The data is available on a quarterly basis and is country-specific. In 
the “Results” section, we report tests that confirm the strength and validity of the IVs. 
2.5 RESULTS 
We formally tested both the validity and strength of our IVs. First, we ran a Sargan test 
to establish the validity of our IVs (cf. Woolridge 2002). The Sargan statistic is not 
significant for both the brand-sales (p > .10) and the category-sales model (p > .10) 
indicating that the null hypothesis that the IVs are uncorrelated with the error term 
cannot be rejected. In other words, the IVs are sufficiently valid. Next, an incremental 
F-test is used to measure the strength of the IVs (cf. Dinner, Van Heerde, and Neslin 
2014; Sotgiu and Gielens 2015). We regressed each endogenous variable on the 
exogenous variables in the model, then, we added the IVs and conducted an 
incremental F-test for the explanatory power of these IVs. The corresponding p-values 
for the exclusion of the IVs suggest that the IVs are sufficiently strong (p < .01 for each 
of the eight endogenous regressors) in both models. 
In addition, for both the brand-sales (F(187, 18640), p < .01) and the category-sales 
model (F(571, 54115, p < .01) we find a significant F-statistic for the joint statistical 
significance of the fixed effects. The null hypothesis that the fixed effects ߙ௕஻ௌand 
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ߙ௖஼ௌ are all zero can therefore be rejected (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, p.70), 
which underlines the importance of controlling for fixed effects. Furthermore, we 
tested the extent of multicollinearity in the models. In Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we report 
the correlations between the different marketing variables, conflict characteristics, and 
control variables for, respectively, the brand and category sales model. The maximum 
correlations are 0.30 (brand sales) and 0.32 (category sales), which are well below .80 
(Judge et al. 1998, p. 868). In addition, the maximum variance inflation factors remain 
well below 10 (Hair et al. 2010), which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the parameter estimates for the brand-sales (equation 1) 
and category-sales (equation 2) models.  
 
Table 2.3: Correlation Matrix Brand-Sales Model 
 Advertising Price Publicity Initiator Brand Equity Elimination size 
Advertising       
Price  .27      
Publicity  .03 -.00     
Initiator  .01  .04  .11    
Brand equity -.10 -.30  .04  .09   
Elimination size  .09  .13 -.03  .01 -.19  
 
Table 2.4: Correlation Matrix Category-Sales Model 
 Advertising Price Publicity Initiator Brand Equity Elimination size 
Advertising       
Price  .06      
Publicity  .29  .04     
Initiator  .19 -.08  .21    
Brand equity  .09 -.15  .04 -.03   
Elimination size -.32 -.01 -.10  .29 -.07  
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Table 2.5: Empirical Results for the Brand-Sales Model 
 Coefficients Standard error 
Marketing Actions   
Advertising  .127*** .042 
Price  -2.160*** .491 
Advertising after start delisting .065* .039 
Price after start delisting .778*** .242 
Conflict Characteristics   
Publicity -.001 .066 
Initiator .283*** .083 
Interaction Effects   
Advertising x publicity -.117** .053 
Price x publicity .871** .341 
Advertising x initiator -.097* .057 
Price x initiator -.753*** .280 
Control variables   
Elimination size .188** .085 
Brand equity -.046 .158 
Start delisting -.335*** .097 
Trend .002*** .000 
Winter .075*** .021 
Spring .046** .020 
Summer .018 .020 
Holiday .012 .016 
Number of observations 18,845  
*Significant two-tailed result at 10% significance level 
**Significant two-tailed result at 5% significance level 
***Significant two-tailed result at 1% significance level 
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Table 2.6: Empirical Results for the Category-Sales Model 
 Coefficients Standard errors 
Marketing Actions   
Advertising  -.025 .309 
Price  -1.677 2.108 
Advertising after start delisting -1.778*** .652 
Price after start delisting -1.646*** .608 
Conflict Characteristics   
Publicity  .245 .253 
Initiator  .119 .087 
Interaction Effects   
Advertising x publicity  -.257 .248 
Price x publicity  .551 .496 
Advertising x initiator 1.842*** .609 
Price x initiator 1.130* .635 
Control variables   
Elimination size -.048 .146 
Brand equity -.742*** .261 
Start delisting -.198** .097 
Trend .002*** .001 
Winter -.009 .029 
Spring -.001 .033 
Summer -.014 .028 
Holiday .015 .023 
Number of observations 54,705  
*Significant two-tailed result at 10% significance level 
**Significant two-tailed result at 5% significance level 
***Significant two-tailed result at 1% significance level 
2.5.1 Marketing Actions   
Confirming prior theory, we find a positive effect for relative brand advertising on 
brand sales (β = .127, p < .01), indicating that, in general, increasing brand advertising 
leads to higher brand sales. Advertising effectiveness for the brand increases in 
magnitude after the start of the delisting (β = .065, p < .10). Relative brand price has a 
negative effect on brand sales (β = -2.160, p < .01), which is in line with extant research 
as decreasing prices should increase brand sales. However, the effectiveness of price 
decreases significantly after the start of a delisting (β = .778, p < .01). It seems that 
price discounts are perceived as untrustworthy at times of a conflict delisting. In other 
words, for the manufacturer, advertising support becomes more effective after a 
delisting, while decreasing the price becomes less effective.  
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In the category sales model, neither relative category advertising (β = -.025, p > 
.10), nor relative category price (β = -1.677, p > .10) are significantly different from 
zero. Interestingly, relative category advertising becomes less effective after the start 
of the delisting (β = -1.778, p < .01), while price changes become more effective (β = -
1.646, p < .01). Indeed, the conflict may have hampered the retailer’s credibility, 
leading to a lower advertising effectiveness and a higher price sensitivity. To 
summarize, in the category sales model, increasing category advertising backfires after 
the start of a delisting, whereas reducing category prices become more effective after 
the start of a delisting.  
2.5.2 Conflict Characteristics 
Interestingly, we find a positive effect of the initiator of the conflict in the brand sales 
model (β = .283, p < .01), indicating that the negative performance consequences of a 
conflict delisting are weakened for the manufacturer if they are the initiator the 
conflict. Instead of attributing blame to the manufacturer (Folkes 1984), consumers 
may actually have empathy for the manufacturer that stands up against the powerful 
retailer. The amount of publicity around the conflict did not significantly affect brand 
(β = -.001, p > .10) or category sales (β = .245, p > .10), and initiator did not have a 
main effect on category sales (β = .119, p > .10).  
2.5.3 Interaction Effects between Marketing Actions and Conflict Characteristics 
Advertising and publicity. As hypothesized (H1a) advertising becomes less effective for 
the manufacturer when there is publicity surrounding the conflict (β = -.117, p < .05). 
This finding is consistent with extant literature in which it is posited that negative 
publicity can damage brand equity and therefore the effectiveness of brand 
advertising (Goldberg and Hartwick 1990). For the retailer model, although the sign of 
the interaction is in the expected direction, the coefficient did not reach statistical 
significance (β = -.257, p > .10). 
Price and publicity. In contrast to our expectations, we find a positive coefficient for 
the interaction between price and publicity (β = .871, p < .05), indicating that price 
decreases become less effective when there is publicity surrounding the conflict. 
Although surprising at first, there will be a high degree of uncertainty present around 
the degree of unavailability of the product. As a result, consumers will be more 
sensitive to this uncertainty around the unavailability, which in turn leads to reduced 
price sensitivity (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). We do not find significant results 
for the category sales model (β = .551, p > .10). 
Advertising and initiator. As expected, advertising becomes less effective for the 
manufacturer if they are the initiator of the conflict (β = -.097, p < .10), thereby 
providing support for H3a. Moreover, we also find support for H3b, as advertising 
becomes more effective for retailers when the manufacturer is the initiator of the 
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conflict (β = 1.842, p < .01). These findings corroborate the notion that consumers 
become suspicious when an initiating company advertises during a conflict delisting, 
resulting in decreased advertising effectiveness for the initiating party. On the 
contrary, if a party is not the initiator of the conflict, advertising effectiveness 
increases. If the manufacturer initiated the delisting, consumers will side with the 
retailer, making the retailer’s advertising more effective.  
Price and initiator. Price decreases become more effective for the manufacturer if it 
is the initiator of the conflict (β = -.753, p < .01), supporting H4a. Accordingly, price 
decreases become less effective for the retailer if the manufacturer initiates the 
conflict (β = 1.130, p < .10), supporting H4b. These findings are in line with the 
reasoning of decreased brand equity when a party initiates the conflict, leading to 
higher price effectiveness for that particular party and lower price sensitivity for the 
other party. They further corroborate the notion that consumers value a financial 
compensation for the inconvenience that the initiator caused.  
2.5.4 Control Variables  
As expected, we find negative sales consequences of conflict delistings for both the 
manufacturer and the retailer. Consistent with Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and 
Cleeren (2017), we find that the negative sales consequences are, over all conflict 
cases, negative for both manufacturers (β = -.335, p < .01) and retailers (β = -.198, p < 
.05). Elimination size has a significant and positive effect on brand sales (β = .188, p < 
.05), indicating that if the entire brand is delisted, sales consequences of the delisting 
for the manufacturer are weaker. If consumers know in advance that the entire brand 
is delisted, they might be more likely to switch to a different store to ensure access to 
the product. For the retailer, we do not find a significant effect for elimination size (β = 
-.048, p >.10). In contrast, brand equity only has a significant impact on category sales 
(β = -.742, p < .01) and not on brand sales (β = -.046, p > .10). For category sales, the 
negative consequences of a conflict delisting are even stronger if a high equity brand is 
delisted from the shelves (see Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017 for a 
similar result).  
2.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We report several additional model checks to demonstrate the robustness of our 
results to our modeling choices. We perform robustness checks by 1) examining an 
alternate time period after the delisting, and 2) adding the duration of the delisting as 
a control variable to our model. 
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2.6.1 Alternate Time-Period 
One of our objectives in the study is to investigate how the effectiveness of marketing 
actions is altered due to a conflict delisting. We hereby rely on the notion that the 
presence of a conflict alters consumers’ perceptions of a brand, hence spills over to 
the effectiveness of marketing actions in varying conflict situations. While the start of 
the delisting is mentioned in the press, the end date of the delisting is not always 
reported. We therefore used a decision rule (see “Data section”) to estimate the end 
date for all cases. 
To assess the robustness of our findings to the decision rule used, we reduced the 
time after the delisting with 25% (to 9 months after the start of the delisting). With the 
exception of the interaction between publicity and advertising, which becomes 
marginally significant, our results remain robust to this alternate time-period.    
2.6.2 Adding Duration as Control Variable 
We included the duration of the delisting a as control variable to both the brand- and 
category sales model, as delistings with a longer duration might affect the sales 
consequences more severely. We operationalized duration as continuous variable 
which equals zero before the start of the delisting, and indicating the number of weeks 
the delisting has been going on. After the end of the delisting, duration takes on the 
maximum value, i.e., the total delisting duration in weeks. Our results show that 
duration did not significantly influence brand sales or category sales. Our findings for 
both the brand- and category sales models remain robust.  
2.7 DISCUSSION 
Conflict delistings occur ever more frequently because of a complicated relationship 
between manufacturers and retailers, and they can seriously damage both parties. In 
response, managers of both types of companies often increase their advertising 
support or use price reductions in an attempt to win over the consumer. However, 
little is known about the effectiveness of these strategies. We therefore examine 
which of these marketing actions are effective in which conflict situations.  
2.7.1 Theoretical Implications 
Our research contributes to and expands Heider’s balance theory (1958) by 
investigating how the consumer adjusts the balance in case of a disruption in the 
triadic relationship (i.e., the consumer, and the manufacturer and retailer) and, more 
importantly, which factors influence these decisions. Once the relationship between 
the retailer and manufacturer gets disrupted, consumers have to adjust the balance by 
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deciding which party to side with: by either purchasing the manufacturer brand at a 
different store or by choosing a different brand within the retailer. Our study shows 
that, in line with Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren (2017), both the 
manufacturer and retailer experience severe sales damages from a conflict delisting. 
This finding indicates that there is quite some variation in consumer choices; some 
consumers adjust their balance towards the manufacturer, while others adjust their 
balance towards the retailer. Our results show that which party the consumer chooses 
is highly dependent on persuasion techniques (i.e., advertising support and price 
reductions) employed by the involved companies. More specifically, depending on the 
contextual factor, some persuasion techniques work better than others in convincing 
consumers to adjust their balance in the right way. The results therefore emphasize 
the need for an expansion of the classical balance theory (Heider 1958) into a more 
nuanced model that takes into account persuasion techniques and contextual factors.  
Previous literature alluded to the influence of contextual factors on restoring the 
direction of the balance (Heider 1958). There is a general belief in marketing that in 
case of a failure, consumers assign blame to the responsible party (Folkes 1984), which 
might cause a decrease in purchase intentions and sales. Contrary to the claim, we find 
that the negative performance consequences of a conflict delisting are actually 
weakened for the manufacturer if they are the initiator of the conflict. Instead of 
attributing blame to the manufacturer (Folkes 1984), consumers may actually have 
empathy for the relatively smaller manufacturer that stands up against the big 
powerful retailer. In this light, it is surprising at first sight that consumers do not seem 
to punish the retailer if it is the initiator of the conflict. However, if a retailer initiates a 
delisting, it is usually to obtain lower prices from the manufacturer, which might result 
in more attractive consumer prices. These two opposing forces might cancel out, 
explaining why retailer sales are not affected by the decision to initiate the conflict. 
The findings regarding publicity are also intriguing. Prior studies have found that 
negative publicity reduces purchase likelihood and sales (Huang and Chen 2006; 
Tybout, Calder, and Sternthal 1981; Wyatt and Badger 1984): publicity could lead to 
increased attention to the conflict and unavailability of the product. We can find an 
alternative explanation in Berger, Sorenson, and Rasmussen (2010) and Cleeren, Van 
Heerde and Dekimpe (2012) who argue that the heightened awareness from publicity 
can cancel out (or even surpass) the negative valence of the message.   
The severe damages from a conflict delisting for both parties emphasize the need 
for appropriate and convincing marketing actions to persuade the consumer to pick 
one’s side in the conflict. To achieve this, it is essential that manufacturers and 
retailers employ different marketing actions to successfully convince the consumer. 
Our findings indicate that, given the inherent characteristics of conflict delistings, the 
effectiveness of marketing actions (i.e., advertising and price) is different from ‘normal’ 
situations. Moreover, we conclude that every type of conflict delisting situation 
requires a different managerial response. This contingency perspective is in line with 
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extant research (e.g., Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), who find that the 
effectiveness of strategic actions is contingent upon the situation at hand. Given the 
importance of these boundary conditions (Whetten 1989), we discuss these findings 
and the ties to existing literature in more detail. 
The presence of publicity around the conflict delisting significantly changes the 
effectiveness of the strategic responses. In line with extant research, the presence of 
publicity decreases the effectiveness of brand advertising. Arguably, the presence of 
negative publicity, which appears for conflict delistings, reminds the consumers about 
the negative event (Maehle and Supphellen 2015), hence, decreasing the effectiveness 
of advertising expenditures. Moreover, starting a wide advertisement campaign while 
it is widely publicized that the product is widely unavailable might send conflicting 
messages to the consumer (Kim, Yoon, and Lee 2010), thereby decreasing consumer’s 
trust in the brands’ advertisements. For retailers, this is a different story, as the 
category advertising is typically not about the delisted brand, but offering different 
brands within the same category. It therefore makes sense that we do not find a 
significant effect for the retailer.  
The presence of publicity also reduces the effectiveness of brand price reductions. 
There is ample research indicating that negative publicity increases brand awareness 
(Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013), especially since the negative associations 
might fade away after some time (Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015). This 
increases brand equity, which makes price promotions less effective (Erdem, Swait, 
and Louviere 2002). In contrast, publicity does not change the effectiveness of price 
reductions for the retailer. Overall, both advertising support and price reductions are 
not effective tools for retailers to win back consumers in conflict situations surrounded 
with high publicity.  
Both the manufacturer and retailer can be the initiator of the conflict. We find that 
price sensitivity increases and advertising effectiveness decreases for the 
manufacturer if it is to blame for the conflict. These findings corroborate with the 
notion that initiating a conflict hurts the relationship with the consumer, thereby 
reducing the brand equity of the brand. As a result, advertising effectiveness is 
reduced (Aaker 1991; Goldberg and Hartwick 1990), while the effectiveness of price 
reductions increases (Erdem, Swait, and Louviere 2002). For the retailer, we 
established the opposite effects: when the manufacturer was to blame for the conflict, 
retailer price promotions become less effective while advertising support has more 
impact. In this case, the effectiveness of the persuasion techniques are not hampered 
by an attribution of blame and a related decrease in brand equity.  
2.7.2 Managerial Implications 
The significant interaction effects signify that, in order to make appropriate 
recommendations, we need to look beyond the main effects, and adapt the use of 
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marketing actions depending on the specific conflict situation at hand. The findings can 
therefore be used to create a marketing dashboard, providing clear managerial 
recommendations for manufacturers and retailers for each specific conflict situation 
(as summarized in Table 2.7). 
For example, for a situation where the retailer is the initiator of the conflict and 
where there is no publicity (base scenario), manufacturers are advised to increase their 
advertising support and keep their prices stable. Retailers, on the other hand, are 
advised to use price reductions and not engage in increased advertisement support. 
However, in the opposite case (manufacturer is the initiating party and where there is 
publicity), we strongly advise manufacturers against increasing their advertising 
support, as it might even backfire. In contrast, in this situation, retailers are highly 
recommended to increase their category advertising to alleviate potential damages. 
The marketing dashboard indicating the optimum managerial response for each 
situation can be found in Table 2.7.  
 
Table 2.7: Marketing Dashboard: How to Respond to Conflict Delistings 
Conflict Situation  Recommendations for Brand  Recommendations for Retailer 
Scenario Initiator Publicity 
Advertising 
Support Price Reductions 
Advertising 
Support Price Reductions 
1  
(base) 
Retailer No Increase brand 
advertising, 
effective 
marketing action 
Keep brand price, 
less effective 
than pre-conflict 
Keep category 
advertising, 
not effective at all 
Reduce brand 
price, effective 
marketing action 
2 Retailer Yes Do not increase 
brand advertising, 
less effective than 
base case 
Keep brand price, 
even less 
effective than 
base case 
Keep category 
advertising, same 
as base case 
Reduce brand   
price, 
same as base case 
3 Manufacturer No Do not increase 
brand advertising, 
shift of blame 
Reduce brand 
price, offer 
compensation for 
conflict 
Increase category 
advertising, more 
effective than 
base case 
Do not reduce 
category price, 
less effective than 
base case 
4 Manufacturer Yes Do not increase 
brand advertising,  
might backfire 
Decreasing price 
might be 
attractive, 
depending on 
opposing forces 
Increase category 
advertising,  
effective 
marketing action 
Do not reduce 
category price, 
not effective 
2.7.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Although our research provides interesting insights, the present study has several 
limitations which present suggestions for future research. First, while our study 
examines manufacturer and retailer actions by looking into price and advertising, we 
were not able to observe what takes place in-store during the delisting. Next to pricing 
and advertising, the retailer has the opportunity to use in-store displays to inform the 
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consumer about the delisting. The display information could merely contain information 
about the occurrence of the delisting, but can also be used to suggest alternative brands 
in the category, such as the retailers’ private label brands or other national brands. 
Although we already have some information about the effectiveness of in-store displays 
in a regular online out-of-stock context (Breugelmans, Campo, and Gijsbrechts 2006), 
in-store shelf information might work differently in a conflict setting, and could be an 
effective marketing action to alleviate damages. In addition, retailers control the in-
store shelf allocation during a delisting. Retailers can make use of this opportunity to 
allocate more shelf space to either their private label brand or other national brands. 
Future research could look into these in-store marketing actions that retailers have at 
their disposal, for example by means of laboratory or natural field experiments. 
Second, we focus on performance consequences in terms of brand and category 
sales, which provide useful and practical insights into our focal research question: the 
effectiveness of tactical actions. Due to data unavailability, we could not investigate 
the total damage in store revenue from the delisting. Consequences on the store level 
might be even more severe for the afflicted retailer, when consumers switch their 
entire shopping basket to a competing retail store. Future research could therefore 
examine the consequences of a conflict delisting on a retailer’s total store sales.   
Third, it would be interesting to examine the effects of conflict delistings and the 
accompanied managerial actions in the long run. Conflict delistings may have an impact 
on the long-term relationship between manufacturers and retailers. For retailers, this 
might manifest itself in reducing shelf space for other products of the manufacturer, a 
lower inclination to introduce new product innovations from manufacturers, or 
decreased promotional support for the manufacturer’s products. On the other hand, 
manufacturers have the option to increase distribution at other channels: they might 
strengthen ties with other retailers, or, even start selling directly to the end-consumer 
by means of direct online stores or fully-owned brick and mortar stores.   
Fourth, in line with previous literature (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 
1999), we assume conflicts and the resulting publicity to be of negative valence, as the 
publicity surrounding the delisting reminds consumers of the unavailability of the 
product. Although in contrast to the often assumed objective role of publicity 
(Balasubramanian 1994), reporters might decide to side with either the manufacturer 
or the retailer, leaving the valence of the publicity unclear. Future research could 
further investigate the role of publicity in conflict delistings, and more specifically, use 
text-mining techniques to investigate the valence of the messages.   
In summary, our study offers important theoretical and managerial insights into the 
topic of conflict delistings. We offer recommendations to both retailers and 
manufacturers on how to strategically manage such a power conflict, giving them both 
the opportunity to fight for their customers.   
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Chapter 3 
The Market Valuation of Conflict Delistings  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts are inevitable in any marketing channel relationship (Gaski 1984; Koza and 
Dant 2007). Especially in manufacturer-retailer relationships conflicts are quite 
prominent, due to often conflicting objectives (Rosenberg and Stern 1971) between 
the two powerful parties. While retailers are under increasing pressure to keep prices 
at an all-time low (The Telegraph 2016), it is in the manufacturers’ interest to 
negotiate high wholesale prices from the retailer (Geylani, Dukes, and Srinivasan 
2007). When manufacturers and retailers refuse to compromise, they often revert to 
removing products from supermarket shelves until the conflict is resolved (Sloot and 
Verhoef 2008). This is commonly referred to as conflict delistings (Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). Recent examples include UK retailer Tesco pulling 25 
Coca-Cola products from the shelves in response to a price increase by Coca-Cola (The 
Grocer 2015) and German manufacturer Dr. Oetker ceasing deliveries to retailer Real 
in response to the desired changes in delivery terms by Real (dpa-AFX 2015). 
Conflict delistings might influence firm value through its effects on profit margins, 
changes in the manufacturer-retailer relationship, and even negotiations with other 
marketing channel partners. However, it is currently unclear when the negative or 
positive effect of a conflict delisting will prevail. Anecdotal evidence reveals that 
retailer Delhaize lost 3.3% in stock price due to a delisting announcement (De Morgen 
2009; De Standaard 2009). In contrast, retailer Ahold gained 0.5% from a conflict 
delisting announcement (Het Financieele Dagblad 2006). Therefore, there is a clear 
need to unify these different effects and to investigate the total impact of a conflict 
delisting for both manufacturers and retailers on firm value.  
Despite their frequent occurrence and large potential consequences, academic 
research on conflict delistings is scarce. Both academics and practitioners therefore 
lack knowledge on the firm-level performance consequences of conflict delistings. This 
research contributes to the extant literature in two ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature on coercive power (i.e., punishments). The mere threat of coercive power 
use increases the number of conflicts in the channel and subsequently results in 
reduced channel satisfaction, trust, and commitment (for an overview see Gaski 1984 
or Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999). However, these performance metrics are 
disaggregate indicators and may not be as informative an aggregate metric. The 
aforementioned measures, for example, do not account for the impact of consumer 
reactions, changes in the manufacturer-retailer relationship and future negotiations 
between these two focal parties, (future) negotiations with other channel partners, 
and profit margins. In addition, these studies are mainly based upon survey research 
and self-assessed evaluations, and it is unclear how these translate into objective, 
economic measures. A notable exception is the research by Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren (2017), who investigate consumer reactions to conflict 
delistings and demonstrate that conflict delistings harm the market shares of both the 
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manufacturer and the retailer. However, they only capture the consumer effect on 
conflict delistings, rather than the total effect of a conflict delisting on the firm. To 
investigate the overall impact of conflict delistings on firm value, we rely on 
shareholder value as our performance metric. Shareholder value is particularly suitable 
since a change in stock prices is an unbiased reflection of changes in all expected 
future cash flows of the firm (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991). As such, 
shareholders will react negatively to announcements in which they expect future cash 
flows to decrease and positively for an expected increase in future cash flows 
(Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012). Thus, event studies allow for an inference of 
cause and effect in a quasi-experimental setting (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009).  
Second, we study how the performance implications of conflict delistings may differ 
across different conflicts and firms. Extant literature has hinted at cross-case variability 
between different (brand) delisting situations (Sloot and Verhoef 2008; Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). We therefore theorize and test in which conflict 
situations the performance consequences are more or less severely affected by conflict 
delisting announcements. To explain the variability between different conflict delistings, 
we draw on the literature on threats (i.e., Gielens et al. 2008). Based on Gielens et al.’s 
(2008) existing framework, we distinguish between 1) the seriousness of the conflict 
delisting and 2) the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict 
delisting. Both are multifaceted constructs, meaning that we utilize multiple dimensions 
for both the seriousness of the delisting (i.e., elimination size and publicity) and the 
capacity to withstand the negative consequences of the delisting (i.e., initiator, firm size 
of the focal firm and its opponent), thereby giving a well-rounded picture into the 
variety of different conflict delisting situations. By analyzing the impact of conflict 
delistings on firm value, we are able to formulate empirical generalizations. Identifying 
empirical generalizations is critical for managers who look at generalizations for 
guidelines for action (e.g., Bass and Wind 1995). Furthermore, by identifying the factors 
that distinguish harmful conflict delistings from advantageous ones, we further advance 
theory in the field by identifying relevant boundary conditions (cf. Whetten 1989). 
To investigate the impact of conflict delistings on firm value and to examine which 
conflict situations cause more or less harm to the firm, we composed a sample of 69 
conflict delistings that occurred between 2000 and 2016 in Belgium, Germany, The 
Netherlands, and the UK. We use the event study methodology, with the change in 
shareholder value around the conflict delisting announcement dates as our 
performance measure. The results show that, on average, conflict delistings are 
detrimental for firms and result in a .66% decrease in firm value. However, there is 
considerable variation in the performance implications of conflict delistings across 
firms, as in almost half of the cases, conflict delistings even resulted in positive 
performance evaluations. In line with our expectations, we find that the more serious 
a conflict delisting (i.e., when the conflict entails more delisted brands and the conflict 
receives more publicity), the more negative are its performance implications. 
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Additionally, the results show that if a firm has a high capacity to protect itself against 
negative consequences (i.e., when the firm is the initiator of the conflict delisting or is 
larger in size), the impact of conflict delistings on firm value will be less negative.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we review the literature 
on the performance implications of coercive power, present the conceptual 
framework, and discuss the hypotheses. Next, we outline the event study metho-
dology, describe the data, and present the results. Finally, we discuss the theoretical 
and managerial implications in the discussion section, and provide worthwhile avenues 
for future research. 
3.2 PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF COERCIVE POWER: A 
LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Conflict delistings, defined as the temporary delisting of products due to a conflict, are 
a result of power battles in which one party decides to exercise its coercive (i.e., 
punitive) power to pressure the other party into complying with its demands.  
Despite its academic and practical relevance, literature on conflict delistings is 
surprisingly scarce. One notable exception of a recent study investigating conflict 
delistings, is a study by Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren (2017), who 
investigate the impact of conflict delistings on consumer reactions. Using a single 
conflict case, they conclude that conflict delistings severely harm the market shares of 
both manufacturers and retailers.  
Because conflict delistings have been under-researched, we take a look at a related 
literature stream, namely the area of coercive power (i.e., punishments). Conflict 
delistings can be considered as a punitive action by one of the channel members, and 
can therefore be regarded as a form of coercive power. The literature on coercive 
power is mainly characterized by survey research, in which parties self-assess the 
relationship with their channel partner. This line of research mainly focusses on 
coercive power as a dimension or driver of channel power and conflict (e.g., Gaski 
1984) and its consequences on relationship satisfaction (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, 
and Kumar 1999; Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992). More specifically, Gaski 
(1984, p.22) concludes that “the imposition of harsh sanctions upon channel members 
(i.e., exercised coercive sources of power) seems certain to cause dissatisfaction and 
conflict.” Furthermore, coercive power sources are positively correlated with conflict 
(Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992) and negatively related to satisfaction within 
the marketing channel (Hunt and Nevin 1974).  
Furthermore, conflicts are known to affect channel performance. For example, 
Lusch (1976) reveals that perceived channel conflict negatively affects operating 
performance. In other words, firms who indicate that they frequently disagree with 
their channel member are typically characterized by a lower operating performance. In 
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addition, conflict also decreases non-economic satisfaction because “channel members 
do not appreciate interactions with parties that threaten them” (Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999, p. 277). In the long term, this decreased non-economic 
satisfaction leads to reduced trust and commitment in the channel relationship 
(Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999). Furthermore, conflicts negatively affect 
cooperation and satisfaction, as they decrease channel efficiency and hinder the 
realization of channel goals (Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992).  
In sum, research on the impact of coercive power (such as conflict delistings) shows 
that coercive power negatively influences the relationship between two channel 
members. However, this research is mainly based on subjective and self-assessed 
evaluations, in which it is not clear how these translate into objective, economic 
measures. In addition, the surveys are often collected at one point in time, making 
causal inference difficult. In this study, we use an objective measure to shed light on 
the impact of conflict delistings, and use a quasi-experimental setting to allow for the 
inference of cause and effect (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Accordingly, we do not 
only take consumer reactions into account, but rather provide insights into the overall 
performance implications of conflict delistings.   
3.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The impact of a conflict delisting on firm value of the involved manufacturer and 
retailer can be considered ambiguous, as it may invoke either negative or positive 
investor responses (as depicted in the Delhaize and Ahold examples earlier). On the 
negative side, conflict delisting may impact firm value given its impact on three 
distinctive performance indicators.   
First, we expect conflict delistings to impact firm value through its negative impact 
on consumer responses. Conflict delistings can cause major short-term sales losses for 
both parties involved. Indeed, conflict delistings are known to cause severe short-term 
market share losses for both manufacturers and retailers (Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017), due to consumers switching to alternative brands 
within the store and consumers switching between stores, respectively. These short-
term effects might persist in the long-term if the consumers’ switch is permanent, i.e., 
if they do not switch back to their original brand or retailer after the end of the 
delisting.  
Second, conflict delistings can be considered as a coercive power source, and might 
therefore decrease satisfaction, trust, and cooperation between the manufacturer and 
retailer.  Therefore, a conflict delisting may not only influence the current negotiation 
process, but may also affect the outcomes of future negotiations after the conflict is 
resolved (Sloot and Verhoef 2008), thereby causing harm to both manufacturers and 
retailers. More specifically, as manufacturers depend on retailers as they make the 
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final decision on which brands to carry in their assortment (Dukes, Geylani, and 
Srinivasan 2009), a retailer may retaliate in three different ways. First, the retailer can 
decide to reduce the number of innovations carried in the assortment, thereby acting 
as a crucial influence on the innovation success of new products of the manufacturer 
(Lamey et al. 2014). Second, retailers can reduce the manufacturer’s shelf space or 
place the products in a sub-optimal place on the shelf, a factor that is proven to be 
crucial for manufacturer’s sales (Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994). Third, retailers could 
reduce promotional support of the manufacturer’s brands, impacting the 
manufacturer’s performance (Gedenk, Neslin, and Ailawadi 2006). Manufacturers have 
possibilities to retaliate as well. In particular, the manufacturer can opt to increase 
distribution via different channels, or even expand or establish a direct channel 
(referred to as encroachment), bypassing the retailer. Encroachment can harm a 
retailer, as it can reduce the demand for a retailer’s products (e.g., Arya, Mittendorf, 
and Sappington 2007; Liu and Zhang 2006). Moverover, carrying the manufacturer’s 
assortment is vital for retailers, as the manufacturers’ often popular national brands 
generate store traffic (Shankar, Carpenter, and Farley 2012).  
Third, a conflict delisting might impact outcomes of future negotiations with other 
channel partners. A conflict delisting may reinforce the negative image of the 
dominant big-box retailer, squeezing profit margins from suppliers (Draganska, 
Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010). In a similar vein, the manufacturers’ image at other 
retailers may suffer a blow. 
Although counter-intuitive at first sight, conflict delistings may also positively 
impact firm performance, in two different ways. First, a conflict delisting may increase 
a firm’s profitability if it reaches an agreement that is beneficial for the firm (Sloot and 
Verhoef 2008). If a firm is expected to ‘get what it wants’ out of the conflict delisting 
and effectively wins the negotiation process, the negative effects (e.g.., sales losses) 
may be offset due to a vast increase in future cash flows. For example, if a relisting 
occurs according the demanded conditions (e.g., higher profit margins or 
enhancement of other buying conditions) the conflict may be regarded as a “short-
term pain, long-term gain” (Sloot and Verhoef 2008). The investors will in this case 
expect an increase in future cash flows, which will be reflected in the stock price. 
Second, conflict delistings may improve the negotiation position and bargaining 
power of the firm in the retailing landscape. A delisting may be a reflection of a zero-
tolerance negotiation policy, emphasizing its strength and dominance in the 
negotiation process. This signal can serve as a warning, not only to the conflicting 
party, but also to other negotiation partners in the market. In the long run, a conflict 
delisting might result in an enhanced bargaining position, which in turn, results in a 
more profitable business model (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010). 
In sum, conflict delistings could potentially lead to both negative and positive firm 
evaluations. While the outcomes of a conflict delisting can be considered ambiguous, 
we expect that the negative implications will outweigh the positive ones. Research in 
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economics indicates that investors are distinctively more sensitive to losses than gains, 
due to loss aversion (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1991). We therefore expect a negative impact of conflict 
delistings on firm value, caused by its harmful impact on consumer reactions, the 
manufacturer-retailer relationship (satisfaction, trust, and cooperation), and future 
negotiations with other channel partners. We hypothesize: 
H1:  Conflict delistings have a negative impact on firm value. 
3.3.1 Cross-Sectional Variation 
Previous literature and anecdotal evidence have alluded to cross-case variability 
between different (conflict) delisting situations (Sloot and Verhoef 2008; Van der 
Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). Consequently, we argue for a contingency 
perspective to investigate the direction and magnitude of the stock market reaction 
and hypothesize in which conflict delisting situations conflict delistings negatively or 
positively affect firm value. To explain the cross-sectional variation in investor 
responses, we build on the conceptual framework developed by Gielens et al. (2008), 
who investigate investor responses in the context of a threat or disruption in the 
market, in their case by examining the impact of a Wal-Mart entry on the incumbent 
retailers. In a similar vein, conflict delistings pose a threat towards the manufacturer-
retailer relationship, and are a disruption of the status-quo. Therefore, in line with 
Gielens et al. (2008), we expect the performance implications of conflict delistings to 
be contingent on 1) the seriousness of the conflict delisting and 2) the capacity of the 
focal firm to withstand the negative consequences of the conflict delisting. For 
example, if the seriousness of the delisting is low and the firm’s capacity to withstand 
the negative consequences of the delisting is high, the positive factors (i.e., possible 
increase in profit, stronger future bargaining position) may prevail the negative factors 
(i.e.., loss in sales, lower satisfaction, trust, and cooperation, impaired negotiations 
with other channel partners). In contrast, if the conflict delisting is very severe while 
the firm lacks the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of the conflict 
delisting, the negative factors are likely to predominate the positive ones.  
The seriousness of the conflict delisting and the capacity to withstand the negative 
consequences of a conflict delisting are multifaceted constructs, meaning that specific 
components can be distinguished within the seriousness of the conflict delisting and 
the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of the conflict delisting. This 
provides a framework in which a wide array of stock price reactions are possible. 
Figure 3.1 summarizes our conceptual framework, depicting these components and 
the direction of the expected contingent effects.   
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
3.3.2 Seriousness of the Conflict Delisting 
A conflict delisting is likely to be more serious when the size of the conflict is large (i.e., 
when a lot of brands are delisted) and when many stakeholders (e.g., consumers, 
other parties) are aware of the conflict delisting (i.e., when the conflict delisting is 
surrounded by a lot of publicity). A more serious delisting not only leads to stronger 
sales responses from consumers, it more severely disrupts the manufacturer-retailer 
relationship, and might damage the relationship with other negotiation parties.  
Elimination size. Elimination size refers to the number of brands that were removed 
from the shelves due to the conflict delisting. Elimination size will affect shareholder 
evaluations of the conflict delisting in two ways. First, conflict delistings involving a 
higher elimination size will lead to more severe sales consequences. For each brand 
that is unavailable during the conflict delisting, consumers have to decide whether to 
switch to a different brand, category, store, or to postpone or cancel the purchase 
altogether (e.g., Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000; Emmelhainz, Stock, and 
Emmelhainz 1991; Sloot, Verhoef, and Franses 2005). When a large number of brands 
are delisted, the forgone product sales can accumulate very rapidly into substantial 
sales and market share losses.  
Second, a higher elimination size might be a bad omen for investors. Indeed, 
something could be fundamentally wrong in the manufacturer-retailer relationship. 
While a minor delisting may indicate a small disagreement or nudge towards 
compliance, a large elimination size indicates that a full-on war has occurred between 
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the two parties. Structural damages in the manufacturer-retailer relationship can 
decrease future cash flows, due to the aforementioned long-term repercussions (e.g., 
increased distribution via other distribution channels, decrease in product innovations, 
loss of promotional support, undesirable shelf space) (Geyskens, Kumar, and 
Steenkamp 1999; Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992). Investors are likely to react 
immediately to this information which places future earnings and cash flows at risk. 
Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2:  The greater the elimination size of the conflict delisting, the more negative is 
the impact of conflict delistings on firm value.  
Publicity. Given its negative valence (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999), a 
conflict is regularly surrounded by negative publicity and press. We therefore consider 
publicity in conflict situations as negative publicity, as it places emphasis on the 
unavailability of the involved products and makes consumers, investors, and other 
stakeholders aware of the conflict situation. Based on information processing theory, 
we know that this increased awareness may considerably influence a consumer’s 
brand attitude and choice (Baker 1999; Hsu and Lawrence 2016). In addition, 
consumers tend to place trust in messages reported in independent media, due to its 
high source credibility (e.g., Eisend and Küster 2011; Lord and Putrevu 1993). As a 
result, if negative publicity surrounding the conflict delisting is high, it will have a 
negative impact on sales (e.g., Basuroy, Chatterjee, and Ravid 2003; Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Freedman, Kearney, and Lederman 2012).  
In support of our premise that conflict delistings surrounded by negative publicity 
will lead to lower shareholder value, we turn to two recent studies that have 
investigated investor responses to negative publicity (Hsu and Lawrence 2016; Van 
Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015). Both studies found support for a negative 
relationship between the volume of publicity and shareholder value. They argue that 
the increased attention around a negative event (i.e., product recall and price war, 
respectively) makes investors uneasy about the firm’s future cash flow expectations. 
As such, widely publicized conflict delistings may be regarded as trouble by investors 
since it may reduce discounted future cash flows, which are reflected in stock market 
returns. It is plausible that we find these negative effects in our study as well, for two 
reasons.  
First, in a product unavailability context, knowledge institute EFMI (2000) 
investigated the effect of out-of-stock (OOS) announcements on consumer reactions. 
They found that categories without out-of-stock announcements were rated 
significantly higher than categories with announcements. Indeed, out-of-stock 
announcements “heighten awareness of the OOS among consumers, making it more 
obvious and probably creating more dissatisfaction” (Verhoef and Sloot 2006, p. 295). 
The authors therefore strongly advise against using messages that emphasize the 
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unavailability to consumers, which coincides with the underlying consequence of the 
negative publicity surrounding a conflict delisting.  
Second, in addition to the effect on consumer reactions, publicity can affect other 
channel partners, such as a firm’s suppliers or other distributors. High levels of 
negative publicity are likely to reach and inform a firm’s other channel partners of the 
conflict, leading to reputational damages of the conflicting parties, i.e., the involved 
manufacturer and retailer. For example, suppliers often feel threatened by the growth 
and efficiency gains of powerful retailers (Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan 2006). A 
retailer involved in a conflict delisting may further support this image of a powerful 
retailer, and disrupts the relationship with other channel partners. Along the same line 
of reasoning, large food manufacturers are often regarded as “driving a hard bargain” 
by their, typically smaller, suppliers (The Telegraph 2015). Additionally, a conflict 
delisting may damage a manufacturer’s reputation at other retailers, which may 
hamper (future) negotiations with these retailers. A conflict delisting may therefore 
negatively alter the relational dynamics between the retailer and its other 
manufacturers, the manufacturer and its suppliers, and the manufacturer and other 
retailers. In sum, we expect the following: 
H3:  The greater the amount of publicity surrounding the conflict delisting, the 
more negative is the impact of conflict delistings on firm value. 
3.3.3 Capacity to Withstand the Negative Consequences of Conflict Delistings 
Apart from differences in the seriousness of the delisting, we also expect the capacity 
to withstand the negative consequences of the conflict delisting to have an effect. In 
general, the lower the firm’s capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a 
delisting, the more negative the performance consequences will be. Johnson and Tellis 
(2008) argue that firms differ from each other mainly in two aspects, namely the firm 
strategy and the key resources. As such, to capture the possible variations in firms in 
the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict delisting, we 
differentiate between 1) whether the focal firm is the initiator of the delisting (i.e., as a 
reflection of the firm’s strategy), and 2) the firm size of the focal firm and its opponent 
(i.e., as indicators of key resources). First, initiating a conflict delisting is a strategic firm 
choice, and indicative of a firm’s strategy in the negotiation process. Second, firms who 
have large financial resources are better equipped to withstand a conflict delisting, 
especially if the opponent has little resources.  
Initiator. A conflict delisting can be initiated by either the manufacturer or the 
retailer. The manufacturer can decide to cease all deliveries to the retailer, while the 
retailer can refuse to stock the manufacturer’s brands on the shelves or cease to place 
orders from the manufacturer. Initiating a conflict delisting may signal towards 
investors that the firm is confident and optimistic about the outcomes of the conflict 
delisting. Due to the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors 
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(Connelly et al. 2011), firms might use the opportunity to signal its true quality to 
investors, in our case, by initiating a conflict delisting. This is in line with research on 
product-harm crises, where non-voluntary recalls are associated with negative 
shareholder value while voluntary recalls are not (Davidson and Worrel 1992). In 
addition to providing a signal of strength towards investors, initiating a delisting also 
serves as a warning sign to future negotiation partners. As such, initiating a conflict 
delisting may be positive, as it may provide a signal that they are “a market player to 
reckon with.” Furthermore, arguably, a firm only initiates a conflict delisting if they 
expect to have the upper hand and come out of the negotiations better off financially. 
While initiating a conflict delisting might signal strength, being at the receiving end of a 
conflict delisting may signal a position of weakness. After all, the initiating firm is 
overtly taking strategic actions to pressure the non-initiating firm into complying. We 
therefore expect more favorable consequences for shareholder value if the focal firm 
is the initiator of the conflict delisting.  
H4:  If the focal firm is the initiator of a conflict delisting, the impact of conflict 
delistings on firm value is less negative. 
Firm size focal firm. Firm size is a primary indicator of a firm’s tangible resources (Audia 
and Greve 2006), including a firm’s financial (Contractor, Kumar, and Kundu 2007; 
Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2014) and human resources (Datta, Guthrie, and 
Wright 2005), and its management expertise (Cui and Lui 2005). Large firms have more 
financial resources than smaller firms (Johnson and Tellis 2008), and are therefore 
better equipped to proactively engage in strategic responses (Gielens et al. 2008), such 
as increased advertising support or price promotions, to mitigate negative 
consequences of conflict delistings. In addition, due to their larger financial buffer 
(Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Hsu and Lawrence 2016), larger firms are less 
vulnerable to small disruptions in their revenue streams. In general, they are more 
capable of sustaining periods of negative performance (Johnson and Tellis 2008), and 
are more likely to survive than smaller firms (Stuart 2000). Additionally, large firms 
have more financial resources to hire experienced employees and invest in training 
employees to excel at negotiations. The resulting negotiation skills, patience, and risk 
tolerance increase the bargaining power of a party (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-
Boas 2010), which will positively reflect the financial outcome of the negotiations. 
Indeed, Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) find that a larger firm size, both for 
manufacturers and retailers, is associated with more bargaining power. Consequently, 
investors may anticipate that the larger firm will “win” the negotiations, leading to 
more future cash flows. In contrast, smaller firms are generally unequipped to handle 
and recover from a disruption, such as the unavailability of products due to conflict 
delistings, because of to the strong dependence of smaller firms on the success of all of 
its products (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). In sum, the larger the firm size, the greater 
the firm’s capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict delisting.  
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H5:  If the firm size of the focal firm is large, the impact of conflict delistings on 
firm value is less negative. 
Firm size opponent. Bargaining power is “not an inherent characteristic of a firm but 
depends on the negotiation partner” (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas 2010, p. 57). 
Firm size should therefore not be considered in isolation, as the outcome of the 
conflict resolution will depend on the size of the opponent as well. In line with our 
earlier discussion on the focal firm’s size, a larger opponent will have more access to 
financial and human resources. A large-sized opponent will therefore reduce the focal 
firm’s capacity to withstand the negative consequences of the conflict delisting, as it 
will be more difficult for the focal party to “win” the negotiation process. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
H6:  If the opponent’s firm size is higher, the impact of conflict delistings on firm 
value is more negative. 
3.4 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
To examine the effect of conflict delistings on shareholder value, we use the event 
study methodology. Event studies have a long tradition in marketing and are 
particularly suitable for investigating shareholder responses to announcements of firm 
events. They have been used to examine investor responses to a wide variety of 
announcements including Internet channel additions (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 
2002), innovation projects (Sood and Tellis 2009), outsourcing agreements (Raassens, 
Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012), and product recalls (Chen, Ganesan, and Liu 2009; Hsu 
and Lawrence 2016). 
The event study methodology is based on the semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis, which states that stock prices accurately reflect all publicly 
available information (Fama 1970). In other words, “a company’s stock price reflects 
the market’s expectations of the discounted value of all future cash flows expected to 
accrue to the firm” (Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002, p. 108). This implies that if 
new information is made public, it will be immediately incorporated into the stock 
price due to investors buying or selling their stocks.9 Thus, a change in stock prices is 
an unbiased reflection of changes in the expected future cash flows of the firm 
(Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991). In line with the semi-efficient market hypothesis, 
the reactions of shareholders to a conflict delisting announcement will reflect all future 
cash flows resulting from the conflict delisting.  
                                                                
9 To isolate the effect of a conflict delisting announcement, cases in which confounding information is 
published on the event day (e.g.., profit statements) are excluded from the sample (cf. Hsu and Lawerence 
2016). 
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To observe shareholder reactions to firm events, the event study methodology 
relies on daily (i.e., trading days) abnormal stock returns. To obtain the abnormal 
returns, we first estimate the expected return around the event day (i.e., the return 
that would be expected if the event had not taken place) using the market model, 
based on an estimation period well before the event. We then calculate the abnormal 
returns, defined as the difference between this expected return and the observed 
return. 
We first calculate the observed returns Rit, defined as the percentage change in 
stock price of case i between day t-1 and day t:10 
 
ܴ௜௧ = ௉೔೟ ି ௉೔೟షభ௉೔೟షభ  
 
Rit reflects the investors’ updated beliefs about future earnings due to information 
that became available between day t-1 and day t. Next, we estimate E(Rit), the return 
that would be expected if the event had not taken place. Following Geyskens, Gielens, 
and Dekimpe (2002) and Hsu and Lawrence (2016), we use the market model to 
estimate E(Rit). In the market model, we regress a company’s observed return (Rit) on 
the market index return in the country the company is listed in (Rmt) over an 
estimation period of 250 to 30 days preceding the event (cf. Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002; Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012, 2014):  
 
ܴ௜[௧ିଶହ଴:௧ିଷ଴] = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ܴ௠[௧ିଶହ଴:௧ିଷ଴] + ߝ௜[௧ିଶହ଴:௧ିଷ଴] 
 
We refer to Table 3.1 for an overview of the market indices per country. We 
subsequently use the obtained firm-specific intercepts ߙො௜ and estimated firm-specific 
slope coefficients ߚመ௜ from equation 2 to estimate E(Rit): 
 
ܧ(ܴ௜௧) = ߙො௜ + ߚመ௜ܴ௠௧ 
 
The difference between the actual return Rit and the expected return E(Rit) is a 
measure of the abnormal return ARit:  
 
ܣܴ௜௧ = ܴ௜௧ − ܧ(ܴ௜௧) =  ܴ௜௧ − (ߙො௜ + ߚመ௜ܴ௠௧) 
 
where ARit provides an unbiased estimate of the future earnings generated by the 
event (Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012), i.e., conflict delistings. 
  
                                                                
10 More specifically, a case (i) refers to one firm that is involved in a conflict delisting. 
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Table 3.1: Market Indices 
Country Market Index 
Netherlands AEX Index 
Belgium BEL20 
United Kingdom FTSE100 
Germany DAX 30  
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 
France CAC 40 
United States NYSE Composite, NASDAQ Composite 
Japan TOPIX 
 
To account for possible information leakage before the event day and the possibility 
that not all information is completely disseminated on the event day (McWilliams and 
Siegel 1997), the abnormal returns are aggregated over an event window [-t1, t2] into a 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The CAR makes it possible to draw overall 
inferences on the expected performance of the event for each individual firm. The CAR 
is calculated as follows: 
 
ܥܣܴ௜[−ݐଵ, ݐଶ] = ∑  ܣܴ௜௧௧మ௧ୀି௧భ  
 
Because the event study is conducted over N events, this CAR can be averaged into a 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR):  
 
ܥܣܣܴ[−ݐଵ, ݐଶ] = ∑ ஼஺ோ೔[ି௧భ,௧మ]೔ಿసభ ே  
  
Thus far, the length of the event window [-t1, t2] is not known. To assess the extent of 
information leakage and dissemination, and thus the length of the event window, the 
most significant CAAR from several calculated CAARs for different event windows is 
selected (for a similar procedure, see e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; 
Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002). To test the significance of the CAARs we use 
Patell’s (1976) statistic. First, the daily abnormal returns are standardized by the 
standard errors from equation 2. Subsequently, the z-values of the standardized CAARs 
can be obtained by the following formula (Patell 1976): 
 
ݖ = ݏݐܽ݊݀. ܥܣܣܴ ටே(ெିସ)ெିଶ  
 
where stand. CAAR is the standardized CAAR of a particular event window [-t1, t2], N 
refers to the number of cases, and M is the number of (trading) days in the estimation 
period. The most significant event window is chosen for further analysis (for a similar 
(5) 
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procedure, see, e.g., Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Geyskens, Gielens, and 
Dekimpe 2002).  
3.4.1 Cross-Case Variation in Stock Price Reactions 
Once we obtained the CAARs and determined the most significant event window, we 
test our subsequent hypotheses by regressing the per-case CARs on the independent 
variables. In line with Jain (1982), the CARi were standardized by the standard 
deviations of the regression residuals (i.e., abnormal returns) of the estimation period 
(from equation 2). The corresponding formula is: 
 
ݏݐܽ݊݀. ܥܣܴ௜[−ݐଵ, ݐଶ]      = ߙ + ߚଵܧ݈݅݉ݏ݅ݖ݁௜ + ߚଶܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ݅ݐݕ௜ + ߚଷܫ݊݅ݐ݅ܽݐ݋ݎ௜
+ ߚସܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ + ߚହܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖܱ݁݌݌݋݊݁݊ݐ௜ + ߚ଺ ௜ܺ + ߝ௜ 
 
where ElimSizei refers to the elimination size of the conflict delisting, Publicityi 
captures the amount of publicity surrounding the delisting, Initiatori is a dummy 
variable that captures whether or not the focal firm is the initiator of the conflict 
delisting, FirmSizei refers to the firm size of the focal firm and FirmSizeOpponenti the 
size of the focal firm’s opponent, and Xi is a vector of control variables including a 
yearly trend and a set of country dummy variables to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity between countries. Thirteen firms were engaged in multiple conflict 
delistings, which may give rise to correlated errors. For example, Dutch retailer Ahold 
was involved in four conflict delistings between 2000 and 2015 (our sample period). 
Therefore, we estimate equation 8 with GEEs (generalized estimating equations) (for a 
similar practice, see Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012).  
3.5 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
3.5.1 Sample 
We composed a sample of conflict delisting announcements by searching the 
LexisNexis (for events within The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Germany) and 
GoPress and PressBanking databases (for Belgian events) over a period of 16 years 
(2000-2015). This resulted in 142 cases (71 announcements including both a 
manufacturer and a retailer). We removed 70 cases for which the firm was not listed 
on any stock exchange. To isolate the influence of the conflict delisting on shareholder 
value, we checked for confounding events that take place on the announcement date 
(Hsu and Lawrence 2016). In three cases, other firm information (e.g., firm sales, 
earnings, product harm crisis) was released. We removed these cases from our sample.  
This resulted in a sample of 69 cases that reflect firms that are involved in a 
particular conflict delisting situation. The sample consists of 36 manufacturing firms 
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and 33 retailers, and span 16 industries (e.g., bottled and canned soft drinks, soap and 
detergents, grocery stores, and general merchandise stores). The majority of the cases 
in our sample reflect conflict delistings that occurred in the Netherlands (41%), 
followed by the United Kingdom (32%), Germany (25%), and Belgium (3%). An 
overview of all the conflict delistings in our sample can be found in the Appendix of 
this doctoral dissertation.   
3.5.2 Operationalization and Descriptives 
Shareholder value. We collected stock price information and market indices from the 
Datastream database. Where possible we always opt for the listing on the local stock 
market, as the delisting will have the largest impact on the stock market in the focal 
firm’s home country. To exemplify, for the delisting of Coca-Cola in Germany, we used 
the stock price information and market indices from Coca-Cola Germany. In case the 
firm was not listed on the local stock exchange (i.e., in the country where the conflict 
delisting occurred), we took the information from the parent company. For example, 
for the delisting of Danone in The Netherlands, we rely on French stock market data, 
as Danone is not listed on the Dutch stock market. 
Seriousness of the conflict delisting. We operationalize elimination size as the 
number of brands that were delisted as a consequence of the conflict, as reported by 
press sources.11 Publicity is measured as the percentage of national newspapers (with 
a circulation of at least 1% of the population)12 that featured the conflict delisting on 
the front page, during the event window, relative to the total number of considered 
national newspapers in the corresponding country. For The Netherlands, UK, and 
Germany, announcements were searched by means of the LexisNexis database. For 
Belgium, we searched the GoPress and Pressbanking databases.  
                                                                
11 For sixteen cases, no exact numbers were available. We therefore used the number of brands reported in 
national newspapers. For example, in the Ahold-Unilever conflict in 2002, various newspapers stated that 
“several well-known brands were delisted, such as Omo, Croma, Knorr, Unox, Bertolli, and Cif.” As six brands 
were mentioned in the newspaper articles, we impute the missing value on elimination size by six in this 
case. For the other missing values, the same procedure is followed. To test the robustness of our findings to 
this particular imputation method, we imputed the missings by the total number of brands of the firm in 
question, as reported by the company website. Our findings remain robust to this alternative imputation 
method.  
12 We limited our media search to newspapers with a circulation of at least 1% of the population. This 
includes, for the United Kingdom, both the weekly and Sunday editions of (in alphabetical order) Daily Mail, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Star, The Daily Telegraph, The Express, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The i, The 
Independent, News of the World, The Observer, The People, The Sun, and The Times, for a total of 18 
newspapers. For the Netherlands, we included AD/Algemeen Dagblad, Het Financiële Dagblad, Nederlands 
Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, Het Parool, De Pers, Reformatorisch Dagblad, De Telegraaf, Trouw, and De 
Volkskrant. For Flanders, we included Gazet van Antwerpen, Het Laatste Nieuws, Metro, De Morgen, Het 
Nieuwsblad, De Standaard, and De Tijd. For Wallonia, we included L’Avenir, La Dernière Heure, L’Echo, La 
Libre, Metro, and Le Soir. For Germany, this included Focus, Handelsblatt, Frankfurter Rundschau, Der 
Standard, Die Tageszeitung, die Welt, and Die Zeit. Except for Belgium, free newspapers are not part of the 
electronic databases, and thus, we could not include them in the media search. 
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Capacity to withstand the negative consequences of conflict delistings. Initiator is a 
dummy variable which takes the value one when the focal firm initiated the delisting, 
and is zero otherwise, information which was taken from press sources or the delisting 
announcement. We hereby focus on the initiator of the focal delisting (i.e., the firm 
that proactively removes the products from the shelf). We operationalized firm size as 
the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions) of the focal firm in the year before the 
delisting announcement, as obtained by the Compustat database. To ensure 
comparability across different countries, all currencies were converted into Euro’s 
using the exchange rate on the day of the annual report. The same procedure was 
repeated to obtain the firm size of the opponent. For the opponents for which no data 
were available in the Compustat database, we searched for information in annual 
reports as reported by other financial databases (i.e., Orbis, Bundesanzeiger, Kamer 
van Koophandel, Bureau van Dijk), on the company websites of the opponent firms, or 
via a general Internet search (e.g., company.info).13 Table 3.2 presents a summary 
description of all operationalizations of the independent variables, and Table 3.3 
provides the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
 
Table 3.2: Explanatory Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Operationalization Data source 
Elimination 
size 
The number of brands that were delisted. LexisNexis, GoPress, 
Pressbanking 
Publicity Percentage of national newspapers (with circulation of at least 
1% of the population) in which the conflict delisting was featured 
on the front page in the event window, relative to the total 
number of considered national newspapers in the corresponding 
country. 
LexisNexis, GoPress, 
Pressbanking 
Initiator Dummy variable which takes the value one when the focal firm 
initiated the conflict delisting, and is zero otherwise. 
LexisNexis, GoPress, 
Pressbanking 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions) of the focal firm in 
the year before the conflict delisting announcement. 
Compustat 
 
Firm size 
opponent 
Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions) of the opponent of 
the company in the year before the delisting announcement.(a) 
Compustat, Orbis, 
Bundesanzeiger,  
Kamer van Koophandel, 
Bureau van Dijk, company 
websites, company.info 
(a) For three opponents, firm size data was not available in the year before the conflict delisting. These missings 
were replaced by the firm size of the earliest available firm size data (i.e., for Norma data from 2005 was used 
instead of 2003, for Storck 2004 instead of 2003, and for Marktkauf we used data from 2003 instead of 2000). 
                                                                
13 For three opponents, firm size data was not available in the year before the conflict delisting. The missings 
were replaced by the firm size of the earliest available firm size data (i.e., for Norma we used data from 2005 
instead of 2003, for Storck data from 2004 rather than 2003 is used, and for Marktkauf we used data from 
2003 instead of 2000). We did a robustness check to test the robustness of our findings to this imputation, 
and excluded the three cases from analysis. Our results remain robust. For opponent Bonne Maman, 
information on assets is missing. This case is therefore excluded from our sample.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable name M SD Stand. 
CARi[0,1] 
Elimination 
size 
Publicity Initiator Firm size Firm size 
opponent 
Stand. CARi[0,1]  - .36 1.94 1.00      
Elimination size 2.88 4.58 -.41 1.00     
Publicity  .03 .07 -.20 .16 1.00    
Initiator .49 .50 .13 .04 .06 1.00   
Firm size  9.44 1.72 .15 .08 -.10 -.20 1.00  
Firm size opponent  8.81 2.07 .01 .14 .05 .04 .21 1.00 
3.6 RESULTS 
Table 3.4 presents information on the CAARs for the 69 conflict delisting cases for 
different event windows. On the announcement day, the AAR is -.44% (Patell z = -
1.586, p < .10), indicating an overall negative reaction of the stock market to the 
delisting announcement on the event day. Of all windows surrounding the event day, 
window [0,1] shows the most significant CAAR: CAAR[0,1] = -.66% (Patell z = -2.984, p < 
.01). The negative sign reflects that, in support of H1, the overall investor response is 
significantly negative, indicating that conflict delistings are expected to cause negative 
future cash flows. This finding is consistent with extant research which shows that a 
conflict delisting leads to decreased brand and category shares (Van der Maelen, 
Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). 
Although conflict delistings are, on average, evaluated negatively by investors, 
there is substantial variation in the stock market consequences of conflict delistings 
across firms. While 57% of the conflict delistings show a negative abnormal return over 
the event window (CAAR = -2.31%), investors positively evaluated 43% of the conflict 
delistings (CAAR = 1.48%). To understand this cross-sectional variation, we estimated 
equation 8 with the individual firms’ standardized CARs as dependent variable. Table 
3.5 presents the results. In Table 3.3, we report the correlations between the different 
independent variables. The maximum absolute correlation is -.41, well below .80 
(Judge et al. 1998). In addition, the maximum variance inflation factor is 2.64, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (Hair et al. 2010).  
 
Table 3.4: CAARs for Different Event Windows 
Event Window CAAR % Positive Patell z-Statistic p-value 
[-1,2] -.0043 47.8 -2.266 .01 
[-1,1] -.0057 44.9 -2.577 <.01 
[-1,0] -.0042 50.7 -1.178 .12 
[0,2] -.0049 43.5 -2.673 <.01 
[0,1] -.0066 43.5 -2.984 <.01 
[0,0] -.0044 46.4 -1.586 .06 
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Table 3.5: Empirical Results 
 Hypothesized Sign Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept  -4.190*** 1.868 
Seriousness of Conflict Delisting    
Elimination size  - -.201*** .044 
Publicity - -7.436** 2.928 
Capacity to Withstand Negative Consequences 
Conflict Delisting 
   
Initiator + .703* .379 
Firm size + .296** .126 
Firm size opponent - .097 .110 
Control Variables    
Netherlands   1.011* .615 
Germany  .351 .559 
Belgium  4.364*** 1.268 
Year  .005 .053 
Other Statistics    
Number of observations  68(a)  
Wald Chi-square  37.81***  
R-square  .358  
(a) For one case we do not have information on the opponent’s firm size, therefore we cannot take this case 
into account for the analysis (see also footnote 13). 
* Significant two-tailed result at 10% significance level 
** Significant two-tailed result at 5% significance level  
*** Significant two-tailed result at 1% significance level 
3.6.1 Seriousness of the Conflict Delisting 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 relate to the seriousness of the conflict delisting. We find strong 
support for the anticipated negative effect of the conflict severity on the relationship 
between a conflict delisting and firm value. As hypothesized (H2), we find that investor 
responses to a conflict delisting become more negative when the elimination size 
increases (β = -.201, p < .01). When a delisting involves multiple brands, the negative 
effects of a conflict delisting are strengthened. More publicity surrounding a conflict 
delisting also negatively affects investor responses in a conflict delisting (β = -7.436, p < 
.05), which confirms hypothesis 3. More publicity makes more consumers and business 
partners aware of the conflict, which increases the potential negative consequences, 
and hence the negative investor responses.  
3.6.2 Capacity to Withstand the Negative Consequences of Conflict Delistings 
We find that firms with a higher capacity to withstand the negative consequences of 
conflict delistings are able to attenuate the negative effects. Investor responses 
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toward a conflict delisting less negative when the focal firm initiates the delisting (β = 
.703, p < .10), thereby providing support for H4. Initiating a conflict delisting might 
signal a strong and deliberate strategy towards investors, demonstrating that the focal 
firm is powerful and optimistic regarding the financial outcomes of the conflict 
delisting. As expected (H5), a firm is able to withstand the negative consequences of a 
conflict delisting if it is large in size (β = .296, p < .05). Large firms have more tangible 
resources which they can use to ‘beat’ their opponent. Moreover, large firms might be 
more likely to win the negotiation process. Surprisingly, the size of the opponent does 
not significantly impact investor responses to conflict delistings (H6, β = .097, p > .10).  
3.7 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We test the robustness of our findings in three ways: (1) by using different methods 
for error clustering, (2) using different operationalizations of our independent 
variables, and (3) adding additional control variables to rule out alternative 
explanations. 
3.7.1 Different Methods of Error Clustering 
In our estimation model, we controlled for clustered errors for firms that were 
involved in multiple conflict delistings, by using a GEE model specification. However, 
for some events, both the manufacturer and retailer are listed on the stock market, 
which are considered as separate cases in our dataset. As this may also give rise to 
correlated errors, we re-estimate equation 8 with GEEs correcting for the paired 
manufacturer and retailer within one conflict situation (instead of correcting for 
multiple firms in the sample). Our findings remain robust to this alternative 
specification. 
3.7.2 Different Operationalizations of Independent Variables 
As depicted in the summary descriptives (Table 3.3), there is limited variation in our 
publicity measure. On average, the conflict delisting is featured on the front page 
during the event window in only 3% of the national newspapers. To assess the 
robustness of our findings, we test for an alternative specification of the publicity 
measure. In particular, we measure the number of times the focal firm was mentioned 
in articles about the conflict delisting, relative to the total number of newspapers in a 
country. Our findings are robust to this alternative specification. 
There are multiple ways to operationalize the size of the focal firm and its 
opponent. While we measure firm size by total assets, one can also use a composite 
measure of total assets, sales, and employees in the year before the announcement 
(e.g., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Raasens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012). The 
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components are standardized, before averaging them into a single variable, which is 
then log-transformed. Because the logarithm of a negative value is undefined, we 
added a small positive value (1) to all data points before taking the logarithm (see 
Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002 for a similar practice). For consistency, we 
operationalize the opponent’s firm size in the same way. In addition, we re-estimate 
our model by including the natural logarithm of sales and the number of employees as 
individual measures of firm size. For all alternative specifications, our results are 
robust, with the exception of initiator, which becomes marginally insignificant. 
In addition, we empirically tested the size of the focal firm relative to its opponent 
(i.e., the natural logarithm of total assets of the focal firm divided by the natural 
logarithm of total assets of its opponent). When a focal firm is larger in size than its 
opponent, one can argue that the capacity to withstand the negative consequences of 
a conflict delisting is larger compared to when both firms are of equal size. However, 
we do not find any empirical evidence supporting this assertion.  
3.7.3 Adding Control Variables to Rule out Alternative Explanations 
We include profitability as a control variable to control for a firm’s past performance 
(e.g., Raassens, Wuyts, and Geyskens 2014). On the one hand, if a firm has a strong 
track record of high profitability, one can argue that it is successful in its operations, 
which can positively be reflected in the conflict delisting negotiations. Profitability is in 
this case a reflection of good negotiations skills, thus the firm is expected to “win” the 
current negotiations at hand. On the other hand, if a firm has poor profitability, 
investors might be happy that it is putting their foot down in negotiations, which might 
be a signal that it is changing tracks and taking active steps to increase profitability. In 
line with previous research, profitability is measured as the ratio of net income to sales 
in the year before the conflict delisting announcement (e.g., Luo 2007).14 Our results 
show that neither the profitability for the focal firm, nor the opponent’s profitability 
significantly affects investor responses, indicating that the two opposing forces might 
cancel each other out.  
Besides profitability, we control for the financial leverage of a firm (e.g., Raassens, 
Wuyts, and Geyskens 2012). Leverage is operationalized as the ratio of long-term debt 
(in millions of Euros) to total assets (in millions of Euros) of the firm in the year before 
the delisting announcement.15 A higher debt-to-asset ratio means that a firm has less 
short-term access to its financial assets; hence we would expect a negative effect as 
these firms are less capable to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict 
delisting. However, we do not find support for this claim, as neither the coefficient for 
                                                                
14 For Stollwerck and Storck, net income was not available for the year before the announcement 
(respectively 1999 and 2003), we therefore used the earliest available data (i.e., 2002 and 2005, 
respectively).  
 15 For three opponents, the annual statement did not distinguish between long-term and short-term debt 
(i.e., Bitburger (Gerolsteiner), Lieken, and Kaufland). In these cases, the total-debt was used. 
The Market Valuation of Conflict Delistings 
65 
the financial leverage of the focal firm nor for the opponent’s financial leverage are 
statistically significant. Our other findings remain robust. 
Our sample consists of both manufacturers (52%) and retailers (48%). Although we 
do not have any a priori expectations, we test whether there is a difference in investor 
response between the two parties. We add a dummy variable to our model, indicating 
whether the focal firm is a manufacturer (=1) or a retailer (=0). We do not find a 
significant difference in the performance implications of conflict delistings between 
manufacturers and retailers.  
3.8 DISCUSSION 
Research on conflict delistings is scarce, leaving both academics and practitioners in 
the dark about its possible consequences. Recently, extant literature has started to 
identify the performance implications of conflict delistings in terms of sales and market 
share (Van der Maelen, Breugelmans, and Cleeren 2017). However, the true impact of 
conflict delistings on firm value go well beyond this direct sales effect, as it may also 
place future collaborations and negotiations between the conflicting parties and other 
channel partners at risk. Using the event study methodology, we investigate the 
overall impact of conflict delistings on firm value, and find support for an overall 
negative effect of conflict delistings on shareholder value.  
Anecdotal evidence shows that there is a lot of cross-sectional variation in the 
stock market response to conflict delisting announcements. Our results corroborate 
this anecdotal evidence. Indeed, while 57% of the conflict delistings in our sample 
result in a negative shareholder reaction, investors positively evaluated 43% of the 
conflict delistings. To explain this cross-sectional variation in investor responses to 
conflict delistings, we build a contingency framework in which we investigate in which 
situations conflict delistings are more or less harmful.  
Extending previous research by Gielens et al. (2008), we show that the driving 
factors behind the cross-sectional variation in the stock market response are 1) the 
seriousness of the conflict delisting and (2) the capacity to withstand the negative 
consequences of a conflict delisting. A first and important insight that can be derived 
from our analysis is that the seriousness of the delisting is inversely related to 
shareholder value in conflict delistings. This is in line with the findings of Gielens et al. 
(2008), who show that shareholder value substantially decreases when the seriousness 
of the threat increases. To shed more light on the wide array of conflict delistings, we 
use both the number of delisted brands and the amount of publicity surrounding the 
conflict delisting announcement as measures of the seriousness of the conflict 
delisting, and find support for both components. A more severe conflict delisting, i.e., 
one in which multiple brands are delisted, bring about more negative investor 
responses. For every brand that is unavailable, firms risk losing consumers due to 
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switching behavior to other brands or stores (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000). In 
addition, a large elimination size might indicate a significant disruption in the 
manufacturer-retailer relationship, which might lead to unfavorable long-term 
consequences (Skinner, Gassenheimer, and Kelley 1992). Furthermore, in line with 
extant research on publicity (e.g., Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), publicity negatively 
impacts the effect of a conflict delisting on shareholder value. Arguably, publicity 
heightens the awareness of a negative event among both consumers and the firm’s 
channel partners, resulting in negative investor responses (cf. Hsu and Lawrence 2016; 
Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015; Verhoef and Sloot 2006).  
Second, the firm’s capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict 
delisting is also an important factor in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the 
stock market response. In line with our expectations, the performance implications of 
a conflict delisting are less negative if the focal firm is the initiator of the delisting. 
Indeed, a firm may start a conflict delisting only when they expect to win the 
negotiation process and initiating a conflict delisting may, thus, be regarded as a signal 
towards investors that the firm is a dominant player in the market. Simultaneously, the 
focal firm warns other channel members about its dominant position. We further show 
that small firms are much more negatively affected by conflict delistings than large 
firms. Relative to its large counterparts, small firms typically have less access to 
tangible resources, making them more dependent on the revenue streams from all 
products (Thirumalai and Sinha 2011). Large firms, on the contrary, have a larger 
financial buffer, making them less vulnerable to disruptions in their marketing 
channels. Moreover, large firms can utilize access to tangible resources to launch 
marketing campaigns to mitigate negative effects of conflict delistings and to educate 
or hire trained negotiators. Surprisingly, the size of the opponent does not impact 
investor responses to conflict delistings. Apparently, investors take an internal 
perspective, and do not take into account (external) partner information.  
3.8.1 Managerial Implications 
This study identifies factors that can either decrease or enhance firm value in conflict 
delistings. While the seriousness of a conflict delisting can be damaging, firms with a 
high capacity to withstand the negative consequences of a conflict delisting may be 
able to protect themselves against the possible negative effects. To find out exactly 
which of these factors will prevail in each different conflict situation, we conducted a 
what-if analysis, delineating the performance outcomes in different conflict situations. 
Table 3.6 presents the results. 
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Table 3.6: Predicted CARs as a Function of the Seriousness of the Delisting and Capacity to Withstand 
Negative Consequences(a) 
Elimination size Publicity Non-initiating party   Initiating party 
  Small firm Large firm Small firm Large firm 
Low Low -.24 .78 .47 1.49 
High -1.0 .02 -.29 .72 
High Low -1.54 -.52 -.83 .19 
High -2.30 -1.28 -1.59 -.58 
(a) To calculate the predicted CARs, the indicator variable to measure initiator is set to zero or one, while the 
continuous variables to measure the seriousness of the delisting and the capacity to withstand the negative 
consequences of the delisting (i.e., elimination size, publicity, and firm size) are set to one standard deviation 
above or below their mean (except for low elimination size and low publicity, where we use the minimum 
instead of one standard deviation below the mean to stay within the range of the data). The other variables 
are held fixed at their baseline level (i.e., zero for indicator variables and the mean for continuous variables).   
 
For the managerial implications, particular interest should be paid to the initiator of 
the conflict delisting and the elimination size, as these are the most important 
actionable parameters that business managers can actively take into consideration 
when faced with a conflict situation. More specifically, manufacturers and retailers can 
deliberately choose to initiate a conflict delisting. Subsequently, the initiating firm can 
determine whether to delist a small or large number of brands, and is, therefore, able 
to obtain more than an estimated guess about the impact of a conflict delisting. For 
example, from our what-if-analysis in Table 3.6, we derive the following for Dutch 
firms in the year 2000 (as our baseline case). First, for large firms, it is always better to 
be the initiating party of the conflict delisting, except when the conflict is likely to be 
very serious (i.e., when the conflict delisting involves a large number of delisted brands 
and receives lots of publicity). Second, for small firms it can also be interesting to 
initiate a delisting, but only if the seriousness of the conflict delisting is low. Third, if a 
large firm gets caught up in a conflict delisting by another party and the number of 
brands delisted is rather small, they should not worry about the consequences as it will 
be profitable. In any other case, for a Dutch firm under these conditions conflict 
delistings will only lead to damages in firm value.  
While managers cannot directly influence the publicity surrounding the delistings, 
the simulations provide them with a precise range. To run the simulations (i.e., 
calculate the predicted CAR’s) for other countries and years, we would add the 
corresponding coefficients from Table 3.5 to the estimated values in Table 3.6. For 
example, for the UK, we deduct a value of 1.01 to every cell in Table 3.6. Thus, 
companies can use our findings to estimate the consequences of initiating a conflict 
delisting, and can subsequently use it to determine the optimal elimination size. In 
addition, the simulations also indicate the predicted performance consequences for 
firms that are the recipient of a conflict delisting. Subsequently, if the predicted 
performance consequences are very severe, they can act upon this in two ways. On the 
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one hand, they can choose to agree upon the opponent’s terms of negotiations, 
thereby limiting the severity of the conflict delisting. On the other hand, however, they 
can choose to actively fight the opponent, by employing various marketing actions 
such as advertising support or price reductions. 
3.8.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Our study has several limitations that offer avenues for further research. First, while 
our study focuses on the overall impact of conflict delistings, which allows us to 
determine the net effect of a conflict delisting for different firms and conflict delisting 
situations, it is worthwhile that future research disentangles this effect. For example, 
future research could build on our finding that shareholder value increases when the 
seriousness of the conflict delisting is low and a firm has a high capacity to withstand 
the negative consequences of a delisting by empirically investigating the drivers of this 
effect (e.g., increase in profit margin, stronger position in the market). As another 
example, future research could look into the damages a conflict delisting may cause to 
the manufacturer-retailer relationship, for example, by investigating how a conflict 
delisting will manifest itself in the future relationship (e.g., less support for new 
product introductions, allocation of less shelf space). 
Second, elimination size is measured in absolute terms (i.e., the number of brands 
delisted). A relative measure indicating the percentage of the focal firm’s assortment 
that is affected could further capture the seriousness of the delisting. Furthermore, the 
extent to which conflicts may harm or benefit the parties involved might also be 
influenced by the extent to which both parties depend on one another. A high 
dependence on the other party could therefore represent an additional dimension for 
the seriousness of the delisting, i.e., if the dependency of the focal firm on the 
opponent is high, the conflict delisting situation is more serious, which will negatively 
affect shareholder value. This might be captured by 1) the share of sales or profits 
derived through the other party (i.e., the contribution-to-sales and contribution-to-
profits measure), or 2) the availability of alternatives in case the focal relationship is 
lost (c.f., Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002). These measures are not included in 
our model due to the unavailability of the data; however, they provide fruitful avenues 
for future research. 
Third, it would be worthwhile to investigate which managerial actions 
manufacturers and retailers have at their disposal to counter the negative effects of a 
conflict delisting. From trade press, we know that both manufacturers and retailers 
make use of their arsenal of marketing actions in an attempt to keep consumers from 
switching brands or stores. Examples include Unilever engaging in a widely spread 
advertisement campaign (Metro 2009) and Coca-Cola offering price promotions on 
Fanta during a conflict delisting (Distrifood 2005b). Marketing actions might impact 
firm value through consumer reactions (e.g., price promotions could lead to more 
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future purchases), but also provide a signal to investors. This signal may not necessarily 
be positive as demonstrated by Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009), who find that proactive 
strategies might have a negative effect on firm value as they signal a lack of manager’s 
confidence in a good financial outcome.  
Fourth, our sample almost completely consists of cases where price negotiations 
went sour. Because the effect of a conflict delisting on firm value might depend on the 
nature of the conflict (e.g., price related versus non-price related conflicts), we 
encourage scholars to distinguish between the different types of conflict delistings 
when examining its performance implications. 
Finally, although this study concentrates on the performance implications of 
conflict delistings, not all power battles result in a conflict delisting. It would, 
therefore, be interesting to compare the differential effects of power battles that did 
not lead to a conflict delisting and power battles that escalated into a conflict delisting. 
While our finding regarding elimination size hints at less severe consequences for 
power battles that did not result in conflict delistings, future research could provide 
more insights into the underlying causes, i.e., is the power or the unavailability aspect 
driving our effect?  
In conclusion, by analyzing the impact of conflict delistings on firm value and 
identifying the factors that distinguish more versus less harmful conflict delistings, we 
provide a much needed first picture on the overall impact of a conflict delisting in 
different circumstances. 
  
71 
Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
73 
Conflict delistings are omnipresent in today’s marketplace. The frequent reliance of 
companies on conflict delistings signifies that this will not always be harmful, but 
rather is likely to be advantageous in some situations. This dissertation focuses on the 
performance implications of conflict delistings, and investigates conditions under 
which conflict delistings are less or more harmful. This chapter discusses the main 
findings, managerial implications, and directions for further research.  
4.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
What are the performance implications of conflict delistings? This dissertation contains 
two chapters dedicated to answering this question. In the following subsections, I 
discuss the findings per chapter, and conclude with a comparison between the two 
studies.  
4.1.1 Chapter 2: The Effectiveness of Managerial Actions during Conflict Delistings 
Due to the rise of powerful retailers, (price) negotiations between manufacturers and 
retailers often go sour and result in conflict delistings, where the manufacturers’ 
brands get removed from the retailers’ assortment. Such conflict delistings can cause 
major revenue and sales losses for both manufacturers and retailers. The extant 
literature lacks knowledge on the effectiveness of marketing actions used by 
manufacturers and retailers to alleviate these severe damages. To fill this gap, I use a 
contingency framework to assess advertising and price effectiveness for both 
manufacturers and retailers in different conflict situations, i.e., the degree of publicity 
and the role of the initiator of the conflict.  
Using household purchase data for a wide variety of conflict delistings – spanning 
different years, countries, categories, manufacturers, and retailers – the findings reveal 
that both advertising support and price reductions are less effective for the 
manufacturer when they are faced with a conflict situation that receives a lot of 
publicity. The results further show that price reductions are an effective marketing tool 
for the initiator of the conflict, but the initiator should refrain from increasing its 
advertising spending. For the other party, the effects are reversed: advertising is more 
effective while price reductions are not advisable.    
4.1.2 Chapter 3: The Market Valuation of Conflict Delistings 
Although it is generally accepted that it is in both the manufacturers’ and retailers’ 
best interest to find ways to cooperate, negotiations between the two parties often go 
sour. One strategy that manufacturers and retailers often use in an attempt to stand 
their ground in the negotiation process is a conflict delisting, where products are 
removed from the shelves until the conflict is resolved. Despite the frequent 
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occurrence and inherent managerial importance, both academics and practitioners 
lack information on the performance consequences of conflict delistings for the firm. 
Therefore, I use the event study methodology to investigate changes in firm value 
elicited by conflict delistings.  
Using an international sample of 69 conflict delistings, the findings reveal that, 
overall, conflict delistings severely damage firm value. However, substantial cross-case 
variability is present. This variability is explained by means of a contingency 
framework, in which the large variability between cases is driven by the seriousness of 
the delisting (i.e., the number of delisted brands and the degree of publicity) and the 
capacity to withstand negative consequences of the delisting (i.e., initiator of the 
delisting, firm size focal firm and opponent). The findings demonstrate that, when the 
elimination size and the amount of publicity surrounding the delisting is large, conflict 
delistings more negatively impact firm value. Companies can safeguard themselves 
against the negative consequences by initiating the delisting or by means of a large 
firm size.   
4.1.3 Comparison of the Two Studies  
Both Chapter 2 and 3 investigate the performance implications of conflict delistings, 
albeit from a different perspective. It is therefore interesting to compare the results of 
the two chapters.   
Performance Implications of Conflict Delistings. Both chapters lead to the 
conclusion that, on average, conflict delistings severely harm firm performance. The 
results from Chapter 2 show that, on average, conflict delistings severely harm both 
brand and category sales. In Chapter 3, we see that, on average, shareholder value 
decreases due to delisting announcements. These results point at a no-win situation 
for both conflicting parties. However, the results also show that the situation is more 
nuanced, as the performance consequences are contingent upon different factors.  
When Are Conflict Delistings More or Less Harmful? In both studies, I investigate 
various characteristics that may affect the relationship between conflict delistings and 
firm performance. In both studies, I examine the role of the initiator, the amount of 
publicity surrounding the delisting, and the elimination size (i.e., number of delisted 
brands). Interestingly, both consumers (Chapter 2) and investors (Chapter 3) punish 
the initiating party of the conflict delisting less severely. One exception is that retailer 
sales are not affected when the retailer is the initiating party compared to when they 
are not the initiating party. I presume that consumers have empathy for the 
manufacturer when they initiate a conflict delisting, while for investors initiating a 
delisting is a sign of strength and dominance.  
The results for the amount of publicity surrounding the conflict are mixed. In 
Chapter 2 findings suggest that the changes in brand and category sales because of the 
conflict delistings are not dependent on the amount of publicity. In contrast, investors 
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do respond to the amount of publicity, in a negative manner (Chapter 3). Apparently, 
consumers are not driven by the amount of publicity, but investors are. This finding is in 
line with extant literature (e.g., Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015). While the 
effect of publicity is ambiguous for consumers, it is negative for investors. For 
consumers, two opposing effects may cancel each other out. On the one hand, negative 
publicity surrounding a conflict delisting emphasizes the conflict and the resulting 
unavailability of the products (e.g., Verhoef and Sloot 2006), thereby leading to 
decreased brand equity of the involved parties. On the other hand, negative publicity 
can positively increase awareness for the brands and retailer (Berger, Sorenson, and 
Rasmussen 2010). On the long run, the negative valence may wear out, while the 
positive consumer attention effect persists (Berger, Sorenson, and Rasmussen 2010; 
Cleeren, Van Heerde, and Dekimpe 2013). Investors go beyond the consumer effect and 
also take the effect of publicity on other stakeholders into account, such as other 
channel members. Generally, the increased attention surrounding a negative event 
makes investors uncomfortable, since it may reduce future cash flows (Hsu and 
Lawrence 2016; Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2015).  
While Chapter 2 concludes that a higher elimination size is beneficial for brand 
sales, and does not affect category sales, Chapter 3 concludes that a conflict delisting 
involving a large number of brands is detrimental for firm value. Consumers are more 
likely to switch to a different store if the delisting involves a large elimination size, 
which increases brand sales. Investors, however, may assume that a higher elimination 
size will lead to more severe sales consequences of the conflict delisting. In addition, a 
large elimination size may disrupt and therefore impact the future manufacturer-
retailer relationship more than a delisting in which only a small number of brands are 
delisted, and therefore harm future negotiations between the conflicting parties.  
4.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of the two studies provide managers with insights into how to react to 
conflict delistings.  
4.2.1 Chapter 2: The Effectiveness of Managerial Actions during Conflict Delistings 
Chapter 2 provides managers with insights into 1) when different conflict delistings are 
more or less harmful, and 2) which marketing actions are useful in which conflict 
situations to safeguard themselves against harmful sales consequences. First, the 
results show that, for the manufacturer, initiating a conflict delisting is less harmful 
than being at the receiving end of a delisting. Managers need not worry about the 
amount of publicity, as it does not impact either brand or category sales. Second, and 
most importantly, Chapter 2 provides marketers with exact insights into which 
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marketing actions (i.e., advertising support or price reductions) to use in which conflict 
situations (i.e., initiator and publicity) in order to alleviate the damages caused by 
conflict delistings. More specifically, a marketing dashboard is composed outlining the 
optimal actions in each specific conflict situation. To exemplify, manufacturers need to 
increase their advertising support and stay away from price reductions for conflict 
delistings initiated by the retailer and not surrounded by publicity. In contrast, for the 
retailer the opposite holds: if a retailer initiates a delisting, which is not surrounded by 
publicity, they benefit from offering price reductions and refraining from increasing 
advertising support.   
4.2.2 Chapter 3: The Market Valuation of Conflict Delistings 
Chapter 3 provides insights into factors that impact changes in firm value due to a 
conflict delisting. This study therefore provides insights into when conflicts are more or 
less harmful. A what-if analysis is conducted and the consequences of every scenario 
are estimated. Especially the initiator of the delisting and elimination size are of 
particular interests to retailers and manufacturers, as managers can influence them 
directly.  
The results of the simulation reveal that for the baseline scenario, Dutch firms in 
the year 2000, it is profitable for large firms to be the initiating party, except when it 
concerns a very severe delisting accompanied by a high amount of publicity and in 
which a large amount of products are removed from the shelves. Parties are therefore 
advised not to eliminate a large amount of products in these circumstances, as it will 
always harm firm performance. In addition, for small companies, initiating a delisting 
with a small elimination size is only advisable if they foresee little publicity around the 
delisting. Finally, if an opposing firm initiates a conflict delisting for a large company, 
the delisting might be profitable as long as the conflict delisting is small in elimination 
size and receives little to no publicity. Overall, it is in the companies’ best interest to 
refrain from eliminating a large range of products or to tip the public press about the 
delisting.  
4.3 FUTURE RESEARCH  
This dissertation provides valuable insights with regard to the performance 
consequences of conflict delistings. In this section I provide several suggestions for 
future research.  
4.3.1 Additional Stakeholders 
In addition to consumer and investor responses, conflict delistings may change the 
relational dynamics between the involved firms and other parties. 
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Non-involved retailers. Manufacturers’ brands are typically distributed at multiple 
retailers (Coughlan et al. 2006), as higher levels of distribution lead to higher market 
share (Reibstein and Farris 1995), and in turn may lead to higher profit. Consequently, 
manufacturers frequently negotiate their terms of agreement with multiple retailers. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, conflict delistings could change the relational dynamics 
between the involved manufacturer and involved retailer, as a party’s bargaining 
position is weaker the more it loses in case of failure (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-
Boas 2010). Subsequently, when a manufacturer is involved in a conflict delisting, it 
may alter the position of the manufacturer in the grocery market, and hence may spill-
over and impact negotiations with non-involved retailers. This is especially the case 
when the breakdown of the negotiations are discussed in the media. Future research 
could complement this research by investigating the impact on future negotiations 
between the manufacturer and non-involved retailers.  
Non-involved manufacturers. In a similar vein, retailers typically negotiate with 
many manufacturers, and conflict delistings might strengthen or weaken their 
negotiation position with manufacturers that are not directly involved in the conflict 
delisting. Moreover, suppliers have reported for years that big-box retailers are 
pressuring them into accepting complying with conditions that undermine channel 
profits (Huang et al. 2012).   
Engaging in a conflict delisting could support this perception. Whether this is 
beneficial or detrimental for future negotiations is a question for further research. 
Competitors. Competitors provide an avenue for further research, in two distinct 
ways. First, given that, on average, conflict delistings are a no-win situation for both 
involved parties, it is likely that the competitor is the real winner of a conflict. To 
exemplify, in the Unilever – Delhaize conflict, competitor Colruyt was crowned the 
winner as consumers massively switched their purchases to Colruyt (Brandhome 
2009). Future research should investigate whether this finding can be generalized. 
Second, competitor reactions may impact the consumer and investor responses to 
conflict delistings. In Chapter 2, we measure the relative advertising and price 
responses to the top 5 competitors, thereby providing first insights into these 
dynamics. Future research could complement this by investigating the absolute impact 
of competitor responses, and more specifically, provide insights into which competitor 
has the most impact.   
4.3.2 Impact on the Long-Term Manufacturer-Retailer Relationship 
Future research could zoom in deeper on how the long-term relationship between the 
involved manufacturer and retailer is affected by conflict delistings. In Chapter 3, I 
indirectly take this into account into the aggregated measure of firm value, but future 
research might take a more disentangled perspective and might provide more insights 
into how exactly this relationship is affected. As discussed in Chapter 3, a change in the 
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manufacturer-retailer relationship can be depicted in the (marketing-mix) outcomes of 
future negotiations, for example, by less new product introductions for the involved 
manufacturer (product), less trade-promotions (price), less advertising support 
(promotion), or shelf space (place). In a similar vein, manufacturers can opt for 
increasing distribution at other channel partners, or opt for direct distribution to the 
end-consumer, thereby bypassing the retailer (encroachment).  
4.3.3 In-store Marketing Actions 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the role of marketing actions in consumer responses to 
conflict delistings. However, retail stores also have the option to strategically alter the 
in-store communication and shelf space allocation. These in-store marketing actions 
provide avenues for future research.  
In-store communication. Due to data unavailability, it was not possible to observe 
in-store marketing actions. However, retailers have the option to strategically provide 
in-store messages to consumers, in which they communicate the conflict delisting 
towards consumers. For example, US retailer Costco placed the following message 
when they delisted Coca-Cola due to a conflict: “At the present we are not carrying 
Coke, Diet Coke, Sprite or any Coke products. This is because in our view Coca Cola has 
not provided us with competitive pricing, so we cannot provide the value our members 
deserve. We apologize for any inconvenience.” Although we already have some 
information about the effectiveness of in-store displays in a regular online out-of-stock 
context (Breugelmans, Campo, and Gijsbrechts 2006), in-store shelf information might 
work differently in a conflict setting, and could be an effective marketing action for 
retailers to alleviate damages. Future research could investigate whether these 
messages are effective, and if so, which elements the message needs to contain (e.g., 
apology, explanation, taking blame).   
Shelf space. In addition, retailers control the in-store shelf allocation during a 
delisting. Retailers can make use of this opportunity to allocate more shelf space to 
either their private label brand or other national brands. Future research could look 
into these in-store marketing actions that retailers have at their disposal, for example 
by means of laboratory or natural field experiments. 
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In the following section, I elaborate on the main contributions of this dissertation in 
terms of their social and economic relevance to society. This process, also known as 
knowledge valorization, is broadly defined as the “process of creating value from 
knowledge, by making knowledge suitable and/or available for social (and/or 
economic) use and by making knowledge suitable for translation into competitive 
products, services, processes and new commercial activities (Article 23 in the 
regulation governing the attainment of doctoral degrees, adapted definition based on 
National Valorization Committee 2011). The social and economic contributions 
resulting from this dissertation are mainly targeted at manufacturers and retailers 
facing conflict delisting situations. More specifically, this dissertation provides crucial 
insights into the consequences of conflict delistings, and thereby facilitating firms’ 
decision making process with regards to conflict delistings (i.e., when is a conflict 
delisting more or less harmful, and how to respond to a conflict delisting?). 
CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGERIAL ACTIONS DURING 
CONFLICT DELISTINGS 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the appropriate responses to a conflict delisting: how can 
firms safeguard themselves against the negative consequences? More specifically, I 
investigate which marketing actions (i.e., price reductions and advertising support) are 
suitable for which conflict situation (i.e., contingent upon the initiator of the conflict 
delisting and the amount of publicity surrounding the conflict delisting). As such, both 
manufacturers and retailers receive tailored recommendations which marketing 
action(s) to utilize for each specific conflict delisting situation. To facilitate the transfer 
of knowledge to practitioners, and to help inform marketing decision makers about the 
appropriate course of action, I developed a marketing dashboard (see Table 2.7 in this 
dissertation). A marketing dashboard is an efficient tool in which a firms’ key 
performance indicator(s) and its underlying drivers are depicted in a single overview. 
Firms can use this tool to make accountable marketing decisions, which is especially 
important given the increasing demands for marketing accountability. The marketing 
dashboard in Chapter 2 helps practitioners to determine the optimal firm response for 
a wide array of conflict delisting situations, in an easy-to-use visual overview.  
In addition to the academic community, Chapter 2 is therefore of great interest to 
both manufacturers and retailers. A tailored advice provides them with the necessary 
tools to assess the situation at hand, and guidance on how to act accordingly to 
minimize damages done to the company itself, and for the involved consumer. More 
specifically, the results of this project provide useful guidelines for 1) marketers, 2) 
purchasing and sales departments, and 3) senior management. First, marketers can 
determine the appropriate response to a conflict delisting by using the marketing 
dashboard. Randomly engaging in price reductions or increased advertising support 
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can be quite a detrimental strategy, as Chapter 2 reveals that marketing actions work 
differently in various conflict delisting situations, and might even backfire in some 
situations. Second, this project gives specific insights into when conflict delistings are 
more or less severe in terms of sales. This information can assist purchasing and sales 
departments in their negotiation strategies. When there is no budget available to 
recover some of the lost sales, they can determine the amount of sales lost in the 
conflict delisting, which can help them in the decision whether to engage in the 
conflict delisting in the first place. Finally, it is likely that the purchasing and sales 
department do not make these choices independently, but rather collaborate with the 
senior management (e.g., CEO or CMO) in these issues. The right information about 
the sales consequences of conflict delistings, and the appropriate courses of action in 
different situations assist senior management to make a solid and well-founded 
support for their decisions.  
In sum, both manufacturers and retailers were clueless how to manage conflict 
delistings, as managerial actions work differently in conflict situations compared to 
‘normal’ situations in which no conflict delisting occurs. The results of Chapter 2 are 
therefore crucial, as they provide clear guidelines for manufacturers and retailers on 
how to respond to a conflict delisting, thereby preventing costly mistakes.  
On a more abstract level, the results of Chapter 2 can also be used beyond the 
manufacturer-retailer dyad, as they provide general insights into how a third party (in 
this case consumers) reacts to a severe power battle. The results could therefore be 
applied to a wide variety of real-life conflict situations (e.g., divorce, warfare), in which 
a third party has to decide who to side with. More specifically, who a third party sides 
with is contingent upon persuasion techniques and the characteristics of the context 
the conflict is taking place in.  
CHAPTER 3: THE MARKET VALUATION OF CONFLICT DELISTINGS 
In Chapter 3, I investigate how conflict delistings affect total firm performance, in the 
long run. In addition, I outline the performance implications for a wide array of conflict 
delistings, providing practitioners clear insights into when conflict delistings are more 
or less harmful for their firm (i.e., depending on the amount of publicity surrounding 
the delisting, the number of brands that were delisted, the initiator of the conflict 
delisting, and the size of the focal and partner firm). For example, it is in a firms’ best 
interest to refrain from eliminating a large range of brands, and to refrain from fighting 
the power battle via public press. The results can be used to simulate and predict firm 
performance for a particular conflict delisting situation (see Table 3.6 in the 
dissertation). Managers can use the simulation analysis to predict what might happen 
in different conflict delisting scenarios, and act accordingly. 
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The results are of great interest for firms that (are about to) face a conflict delisting 
situation. Also here, the results provide crucial insights for everyone involved in the 
conflict delisting, including: marketers, purchasing and sales departments, or senior 
management. In conclusion, in Chapter 3 I provide a much needed first picture on the 
full impact of a conflict delisting on firm value in different circumstances.  
To summarize, this dissertation shows that, overall, conflict delistings have a 
negative impact on firm performance. However, the direction and magnitude of the 
effect is contingent upon the specific conflict delisting situation. Firms can use this 
information to assess the performance implications of conflict delistings. In addition, 
this dissertation provides a marketing dashboard with clear guidelines for practitioners 
on how to alleviate these negative consequences.  
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Due to the rise of powerful retailers, (price) negotiations between manufacturers and 
retailers often go sour, and result in conflict delistings, where the manufacturers’ 
brands get removed from the retailers’ assortment. Despite their frequent occurrence 
and their potential harmful effects, both academics and practitioners lack information 
on the performance implications of conflict delistings. This dissertation consists of two 
empirical chapters that examine the performance implications of conflict delistings, 
and investigates conditions under which conflict delistings are more or less harmful, 
albeit from a different perspective.  
Chapter 2 takes a consumer perspective to conflict delistings, and focus on the 
impact of conflict delistings on sales. Conflict delistings can seriously harm 
manufacturer and retailer sales, due to consumers switching to alternative brands 
within the store and consumers switching between stores, respectively. I want to 
unravel which managerial strategies are most suitable in which conflict situation to 
alleviate these potential losses, and focus on the effectiveness of the manufacturer’s 
as well as the retailer’s advertising support and price reductions. I compose a unique 
and extensive dataset of all conflict delistings that occurred between 2002 and 2012 in 
four European countries - spanning different categories, manufacturers, and retailers - 
and reveal that both advertising support and price reductions are less effective when 
faced with a conflict situation that receives a lot of publicity. The results further show 
that price reductions are an effective marketing tool for the initiator of the conflict, but 
the initiator should refrain from increasing its advertising spending. For the other 
party, the effects are reversed: advertising is more effective while price reductions are 
not advisable. The results of the study thereby provide a marketing dashboard guiding 
both manufacturers and retailers on which marketing actions are more effective in 
different types of conflict situations. 
Chapter 3 takes an investor perspective, and examines the effect of conflict 
delistings on total firm value (stock return). Results from an event study show that, on 
average, conflict delistings severely harm firm value. The direction and magnitude of 
the stock market reaction is contingent upon the seriousness of the delisting and the 
capacity to withstand its negative consequences. When the conflict delisting is more 
serious (i.e., when more brands are delisted and the conflict delisting is heavily 
publicized), conflict delistings negatively influence firm value. If a firm has the capacity 
to withstand its negative consequences (i.e., when the firm is the initiator or is larger), 
firm value is less negatively affected.   
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